last modified: 18 November 2005

 

1. Background

1.1 Security Issues in the Region

The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

In July 1992 Abkhazian separatists declared their independence from Georgia, leading to a war between the Abkhazians and Georgian Government forces. Supported by volunteers, partly from other countries, Abkhazian forces gained territory within their region. Looking for a way out, Georgia asked Russia to mediate as a regional power. This gave Russia the opportunity to expand its influence on the non-CIS state Georgia. After the failure of the first agreement between the separatists, Georgia and Russia, a second ceasefire was signed by all three parties on July 27th, 1993. The agreement favours the separatist side, which at the present moment controls all of Abkhazia. On May 14th, 1994, the Abkhazian and Georgian parties met in Moscow and signed an agreement on the deployment of CIS peacekeeping troops in the region.


The Georgian-Ossetian conflict

Following ethnic tensions and the abolition of the autonomous status of South Ossetia by the Georgian government in December 1990, Ossetian separatists began an armed revolt in the spring of 1992. They demanded the unification of North and South Ossetia, with the consequence of integrating the region into the Russian Federation. As a result of negotiations between Georgian President Shevarnadze and Russian President Yeltsin a ceasefire agreement was signed in June 1992, and a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was deployed.
 

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh started in 1988 following a vote by the regional Soviet authorities, that mandated the transfer of the predominantly ethnic Armenian province from Azerbaijan to Armenia. As a result, war broke out in 1989 between Azerbaijani forces and Karabakh militias supported by Armenia. On January 18th, 1992 the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh declared its independence. On May 12th, 1994 a ceasefire agreement was signed with the mediation from Russia.


1.2 International Missions in the Region

*The CSCE renamed itself OSCE at the Budapest Summit in Dec. 1994*

OSCE Mission in Georgia

The OSCE mission in Georgia was established in December 1992 to reach a peaceful political settlement to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and to help define the political status of the South-Ossetian region within Georgia. In Abkhazia the OSCE supports the UN in its efforts to maintain the territorial sovereignty of Georgia, while at the same time taking into account the interests of the Abkhazian population, a position that is expressed in the CSCE Declaration at the Budapest Summit of December 1994. Cooperation between the OSCE and the CIS peacekeeping forces deployed in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an issue that is addressed in Chapter III of the Helsinki Document of 1992. Click here for the OSCE Declaration on Georgia from November 1999. On December 15th, 1999 the mission was extended to monitor the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic.

 

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

UNOMIG was established on August 24th, 1993 by Security Council Resolution 858. Following the Abkhazian-Georgian Agreement signed in Moscow in May 1994, the mandate of UNOMIG was extended by Security Council Resolution 937 (1994), which included the monitoring and verification of the agreement's implementation by the involved parties, as well as providing for cooperation between UNOMIG and CIS peacekeeping forces. The mandate of UNOMIG has been repeatedly extended, most recently until January 31st, 2003 by Security Council Resolution 1427 (2002).
In December 2001 the Secretary-General's Special Representative D. Boden presented the document "Basic Principles
for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" to provide a basis for negotiations between the Abkhaz and Georgian leaders on the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia. Despite the support of the "Friends of Georgia", a group including the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and Bulgaria, objections are still being made by the Abkhaz side to use the paper as a basis for negotiations. 


OSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh

The CSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki decided in March 1992 to convene a conference in order to promote the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk Conference did not take place since Azerbaijan wanted the occupied territories to be returned first, but this initiative gave birth to the Minsk Group. The Minsk Group, now comprising Austria, Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the United States as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, aims for a political solution to the conflict and to let the Minsk Conference take place.
The December 1994 Budapest Summit expressed the will to set up a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force in the region. A high-level planning group (HLPG) was established in Vienna to examine the modalities of a deployment if the two conflicting parties reach an agreement. Additionally, a Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the conflict was appointed in August 1995 to assist in achieving this agreement. At the December 1996 Lisbon Summit the Chairman-in-Office defined in a statement, supported by all participating states except Armenia, the principles to be part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The OSCE has so far not managed to reach a consensus on a basis for negotiations between the parties.
 

1.3 Relations among the Southern Caucasus States and Cooperation in the Context of Regional Organisations

In the Southern Caucasus Armenia remains a close ally of Russia, whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan increasingly cooperate with NATO and other international organisations, distancing themselves from Russia.

Armenia wants to keep close relations with Russia to protect itself from potential threats coming from its neighbours Azerbaijan and Turkey. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are still problematic regarding the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Click here for a statement by Armenian President R. Kocharian on Nagorno Karabakh.
Georgia maintains good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, stressing the need for cooperation to improve the stability of the Caucasus. Georgia considers strengthening the relations with the European Union and the United States and its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures as a major objective of its foreign policy. From this cooperation, Georgia expects to eventually obtain security guarantees. Click here for references to the EU and the United States in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Azerbaijan follows the same foreign policy line as Georgia, trying to develop close relations with its neighbours Georgia and Turkey, for instance through the agreement on a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project which was signed in 1999. Azerbaijan evoked the possibility of membership in NATO and of accepting NATO military bases on its territory. In view of this, Russia is trying to improve its relations with Azerbaijan.

Regional organisations like GUUAM and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) were created as an alternative to the CIS, which is perceived to be dominated by Russian interests. Both organisations view the future security of the region as depending first upon economic and technical cooperation, as well as the development of infrastructure between the countries in order to facilitate the access to European and international markets. GUUAM countries, particularly Ukraine, are willing to reduce their dependence on energy and pipeline infrastructure from Russia and are therefore promoting a Eurasian Transportation Corridor for energy and goods.
For its part, the BSEC is trying to bring Russia to adopt a cooperative policy towards countries in the Black Sea region. The BSEC, which became an international economic regional organisation in April 1999, is developing communication networks and transport infrastructure between its members.


GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova)

GUAM, an organisation whose name is made up of the initials of its member states, was founded in 1997 by the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Its goal is to establish cooperation between these four states on political, economic and security issues, with the objective of strengthening their independence and sovereignty. During the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 Uzbekistan joined the organisation, resulting in the change of the organisation's name from GUAM to GUUAM. On this occasion GUUAM member states expressed their wish to cooperate closely with NATO within the framework of the EAPC and PfP Programmes in a joint statement. Click here for an older GUAM statement on cooperation with NATO (1997).
In the security field, cooperation among GUUAM states is based on a commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts based on a respect for territorial sovereignty. This position includes common peacekeeping activities, the fight against international terrorism and extremism and the adoption of Euro-Atlantic and European structures of security. GUUAM states also expressed their wish to cooperate in the security of transport corridors and pipelines. GUUAM expressed a critical view of the CIS peacekeeping mechanism's efficiency  in securing stability in the region in a joint statement at the special meeting of the OSCE security model committee in July 1998.
The New York Memorandum was signed by the Presidents of the GUUAM states on September 6th, 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit in order to institutionalise GUUAM consulting mechanisms. During the Yalta Summit in Ukraine in June 2001 GUUAM member states signed the Yalta Charter (in Russian). Following September 11th, a joint statement was issued with the United States on cooperation to fight terrorism. At the Yalta Summit of July 2002, an agreement establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) was signed by the four countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The ineffectiveness of GUUAM in implementing its decisions since its creation in 1997 was underlined with the decision of Uzbekistan to suspend its membership in the organization in June 2002.


The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

The BSEC, founded in 1992 by eleven states, is aimed primarily at increasing economic cooperation and development in the Black Sea region. Click here for the Declaration of the BSEC at its founding summit in Istanbul. Its membership comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. BSEC objectives are not restricted to the economic field, but consider economic cooperation to be a basis for the promotion of peace and security within the region. The Southern Caucasus states are also trying to increase their cooperation with the European Union through the BSEC. Click here for references to the BSEC in the Foreign Policy Concept of Georgia.
Click here for the Bosphorus Statement of June 25th, 1992 and the Istanbul Summit Declaration of November 18th, 1999.
The Agreement on the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was signed on April 2nd, 2001 in Istanbul by six member states of the BSEC: Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. BLACKSEAFOR will pool the naval forces of these countries in order to respond to emergency situations, its tasks including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine countermeasures and environmental protection. Click here for the statement by Georgian Minister of Defence D. Tevzadze on Blackseafor at the EAPC Meeting of Defence Ministers, June 8th, 2001. A document on confidence- and security-building measures in the Black Sea area was signed in Kiev on April 25th, 2002. In its Istanbul Decennial Summit Declaration of June 2002, the BSEC expressed its will to build stronger ties with the EU.


2. Russia and the Southern Caucasus

Russia tried to keep its historical control of the Caucasus region by integrating the former Soviet Republics into a security system in which it took the role of a "security manager". However, the CIS did not succeed at gaining credibility as a regional peacekeeping system, which gave some member states the incentive to explore other options for conflict settlement. Some of the CIS member states are opening up to the influence of Western organisations (primarily to NATO), and are furthermore seeking alliances with neighbouring states like Turkey as well as cooperating in subregional organisations like GUUAM.
In the aftermath of September 11th, the presence of U.S. military advisers in Georgia appears to be further reducing Russian influence in the region. At the US-Russian Summit of May 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President V. Putin recognized in a joint declaration the common interest of their countries in the stability and security of Central Asia and the Caucasus and affirmed cooperation in the resolution of regional conflicts.

2.1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed on December 8th, 1991 by the presidents of Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine. Later on the Almaty Declaration and Protocol to the Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was adopted on December 21st, 1991 by the eleven republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan as an observer. Azerbaijan joined the CIS on September 24th, 1993 and Georgia on December 9th, 1993.  

See the Charter of the Commonwealth
of Independent States.


The CIS Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on May 15th, 1992  by six of its members: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus joined later.
However, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan decided in April 1999 not to renew the CIS Collective Security Treaty.  

Click here for an overview on membership of
the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty.


The activities of this group have concentrated on two issues: peacekeeping operations and the fight against terrorism.

    An Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS was signed during the Kiev Summit on March 20th, 1992 by all CIS members except Turkmenistan.

    A CIS Antiterrorist Center was established on December 1st, 2000 during the CIS Summit Meeting in Minsk. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine expressed reservations to the founding of this organisation, and refused to participate in all of its prescribed activities. On May 25th, 2001 the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty met in Yerevan and issued a joint statement in which they declared international terrorism and extremism to be a major challenge to the security of CIS countries.

References to the CIS in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2000

For more information about the CIS visit the Russia - Central Asia Archive.


2.2 Relations with Southern Caucasus states

Russian-Georgian relations

Following its independence in April 1991, Georgia accused Russia of supporting the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia in order to destabilise the country's internal political situation. In Georgia's view, it was the aim of Russia to thereby strengthen its influence in the region. At the same time, Georgia is in a position to accept the military presence of the CIS peacekeeping forces within its territory in order to maintain the ceasefire in Abkhazia. This presence implies a degree of Russian political and military influence within Georgia.

The following issues are now determining the relations between Russia and Georgia:

The withdrawal by the Russian Federation of troops and military equipment from Georgia

In the context of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) undertaken during the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999, the Russian Federation agreed to withdraw part of its military equipment from Georgian territory in a joint statement with Georgia. Russia undertook to close the military bases of Gudauta and Vaziani by July 1st, 2001, while Georgia granted Russia the right to basic temporary deployment at the bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. But as of now, Russia is still procrastinating on the withdrawal from Gudauta. In the NATO Prague Summit Declaration adopted on November 21st, 2002, the Russian government was urged to fulfil the Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova.
 
For more information visit our CFE site.


Tension over border control

The presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge and of Georgian armed groups in the Kodori valley is a primary source of tension between Russia and Georgia. The Pankisi gorge, a region bordering Chechnya, became a home for Chechen refugees following the Chechen war. The Kodori valley is the only area in Abkhazia, which is still under the control of the Georgian government. The Russian government repeatedly accused the Georgian government of allowing Chechen fighters to use the Pankisi gorge as a safe haven and announced their intention to lead a counterterrorist operation in this area. The Georgian government, for its part, denounced the attempt made by the Russian government to interfere with its sovereignty. Following September 11th and in the context of the U.S. military aid to Georgia regarding counterterrorist activities, the mutual accusations are intensifying.

Two issues are raised by Russia in its criticism of Georgian policy

a) The presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge

In an official declaration regarding an incident on the Russian-Georgian border dating back to 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry urged the Georgian government to cooperate in operations against terrorist activities. Following September 11th, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement warning of the spread of international terrorism into Georgian territory. The Russian Foreign Ministry asked repeatedly for the extradition of Chechen rebels arrested by Georgian border guards while crossing the Russian-Georgian border, most recently in August 2002. The refusal by the Georgian government led the Russian government to question Georgia´s goodwill in participating in the fight against international terrorism.
On August 25th the Georgian government, under the leadership of Georgian law-enforcement agencies, launched a security operation in the Pankisi gorge. In an appeal to the UN Secretary General and to the UN Security Council and heads of OSCE countries on September 12th Russian President V. Putin criticized the Georgian security operation which failed to arrest the Chechen fighters and international terrorists who allegedly moved to other areas. He declared the intention of the Russian government to expand its anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya to the Georgian territory by citing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on anti-terrorism and the right of "self-defense" under the UN Charter. This appeal followed a statement by V. Putin in Sochi on September 11th, threatening to launch preemptive strikes against Chechen fighters in the Pankisi gorge, which provoked a prompt reaction from the Georgian side in a statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry. The Russian Duma declared in a statement on September 13th its support for a Russian military operation in the Pankisi gorge. Already on August 26th the Russian Foreign Ministry called in a statement for a joint Georgian-Russian counterterrorist operation in the area.
During a meeting in Chisinau on October 6th, Russian President V. Putin and Georgian President E. Shevarnadze agreed in a joint statement on joint military patrols of the Russian-Georgian border and on closer cooperation between their countries´ special services. On this occasion Georgian President E. Shevarnadze announced the extradition of the 13 Chechen suspects detained in Georgian custody since August 2002 to Moscow on terrorism charges. After the extradition of five detainees, the Georgian government suspended its decision to hand over the remaining eight suspects to the Russian authorities following an appeal from the European Court of Human Rights. The recent Moscow hostage crisis in October 2002 renewed the pressure of Russian authorities on Georgia to extradite the Chechen suspects still in custody. After having received guarantees from the Russian government regarding the future treatment of the prisoners, the European Court of Human Rights announced in a communique on November 26th that it no longer has any objection to the extradition of the Chechen suspects.
On December 7th, an anti-crime operation was conducted by Georgian law-enforcers in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi resulting in the arrests of 80 people and the extradition to Russia of one Chechen suspected of being involved in the Moscow apartment house bombings of 1999. The Georgian Ministry of State Security disclosed in January 2003 classified materials, including video tapes, in proof of the presence of Chechen and Arab fighters and their training camps in the Pankisi Gorge.
 
See the online magazine Civil Georgia for more information about the Pankisi gorge.
See EurasiaNet Pankisi Gorge Archive.


b) The support for armed groups in the Kodori valley

A series of incidents in the Kodori valley of Abkhazia, ranging from the shooting down of a UN helicopter and violation of Georgian airspace by Russian military jets in October and November 2001 to a quick deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops in April 2002, led to tensions between Russia and Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing the Georgian policy of tolerance towards terrorist groups. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted by accusing Russia of interfering with its sovereignty in a statement on October 10th, 2001 and a following statement on November 28th, 2001. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued another statement on September 3rd in reaction to the civil casualties resulting from a bombing raid by the Russian military aircraft on Georgian territory on August 23rd.
In the context of alleged support by the Georgian government to guerrilla groups, Russia accused Georgia of increasing  the instability in the Kodori valley as preparation for military operations in Abkhazia. In a statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry these accusations were rejected as groundless and mainly motivated by Russian concerns over Georgian-American military cooperation in counter-terrorist activities.

c) Special visa regime for breakaway regions

In December 2000, the Russian Federation granted a special visa arrangement to the Abkhazian and South-Ossetian regions, which undermined Georgia's control over transit across its borders. Click here for the corresponding statement on the introduction of a new visa regime between the Russian Federation and Georgia from the Russian Foreign Ministry and a statement by the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from June 2002 on the negative consequences of this special regime for the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
 
Click here for a selection of Research Studies on Georgia.


Nagorno Karabakh

In January 2000 Russia expressed its readiness to act as a guarantor if a settlement to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict could be reached. In this way, Russia hoped to regain influence over Azerbaijan and to profile itself as a peacemaker in the region. Click here for Russia's declaration on acting as a guarantor.
 


3. NATO and the Caucasus

3.1 Cooperation between the Southern Caucasus states and NATO

The signing of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document by Azerbaijan on May 4th, 1994, by Georgia on May 23rd, 1994 and by Armenia on October 5th, 1994 institutionalised the cooperation of the Southern Caucasus states with NATO. This strategy of cooperation had first been developed within the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Joint Council). The Southern Caucasus countries have recently begun to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR), Azerbaijan having troops within the Turkish Battalion. Click here for references to NATO international peacekeeping forces in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Click here for the statements by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Azerbaijan on NATO's role in the Caucasus at the meeting of the EAPC on December 15th, 2000 and references to NATO in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On September 13th, 2002 the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the Georgian government to take the necessary steps to start the accession process to NATO. On October 1st, a memorandum of understanding on logistic cooperation was signed between Georgia and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO), opening the way for the implementation of a PfP Trust Fund Project for the demilitarization and disposal of missile stockpiles and the remediation of Georgian military sites. Georgia and Azerbaijan officially applied for joining NATO at the NATO Prague Summit of November 21st-22nd, 2002 as declared in a statement by Georgian President E. Shevarnadze and a statement by the President of Azerbaijan H. Aliyev.

3.2 U.S. Interests in the Caucasus

In the Caucasus - and generally in the Caspian area - the objective of the U.S. until recently was primarily to maintain access to the region, particularly to its oil and gas resources, while at the same time avoiding involvement in regional conflicts or direct confrontation with other major powers. The United States is mainly interested in assuring the security conditions that are necessary for oil production and export.
However, this policy of neutrality is likely to change with the sending of U.S. military advisers to Georgia in April 2002.

U.S. involvement in the Caucasus

Following September 11th the United States increased its involvement in the Caucasus. Click here for a statement on U.S. Policy in the Caucasus by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, E. Jones, from March 13th, 2002.

The U.S. policy in the Caucasus focuses on two issues:

    Counterterrorism: With the Georgian Train-and-Equip Program, which was launched on April 29th, 2002, the United States offered military assistance in counter-terrorism to Georgia in response to the growing instability of the Pankisi Valley, a region bordering Chechnya on Georgian territory. At the U.S.-Russian Summit of May 2002 the United States affirmed its commitment to work along with Russia on the elimination of terrorism in Georgia in a joint statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on counterterrorism cooperation. In a statement on September 14th, U.S. President G. W. Bush affirmed its full support for the Georgian government security operation in the Pankisi gorge and appealed to Russian President V. Putin to allow the Georgian government to fulfill this task. On September 26th the U.S. Mission to the OSCE outlined in a statement the opposition of the United States to any unilateral Russian military action inside Georgian territory. Click here for a description of terrorist activities in Georgia in the report Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001-Eurasia Overview issued by the U.S. Department of State on May 24th, 2002. See the testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs L. Pascoe from September 24th, 2002 for an overview of Georgia´s strategic importance for the United States.

    Resolution of regional conflicts: The United States stressed the need for a political settlement of the conflicts in the region and affirmed its readiness to cooperate with Russia on this issue in a joint declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin at the U.S.-Russian Summit of May 2002. Click here for a statement on Armenia by the United States Mission to the OSCE from March 21st, 2002

Pipeline projects

The transport of Caspian energy resources to international markets is an issue that involves the interests of all major powers acting in the region: Russia, the United States, Turkey, Iran and China. The aim of U.S. involvement in oil production and export in the Caspian Region is to reduce the its future dependence on oil resources in the Persian Gulf. The two major oil exporting countries in the Caspian region are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In 1994 the Azeri State Oil Company (SOCAR) signed the "Contract of the Century" with an international consortium of foreign oil companies. Click here for information about participation of foreign oil companies in Azerbaijan.
Under the Clinton Administration, a Caspian energy diplomacy effort was initiated as described in a statement by the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin energy diplomacy, J. Wolf, from October 4th, 2000. A general description of the U.S. interests in the Caspian region can be found in a statement by Under Secretary S. Eizenstat on Caspian energy development from October 23rd, 1997. The Clinton Administration followed a "Caspian strategy", which consisted in the promotion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline through Turkey. An alternative to this plan would be the Baku-Supsa route on the Georgian Black Sea coast. For its part, Russia is seeking to promote the use of the existing oil pipeline which runs through Grozny between Baku and Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast. This option has the advantage of being cheaper than the construction of a new pipeline through Georgia, but both the United States and the countries in the region are trying to avoid a Russian monopoly. Also, due to the volatile political situation there, the route through Chechnya is not secure; the pipelines have been subject to numerous terrorist attacks during the Chechen crisis. The security of pipelines is of concern to all of the countries involved, as pipelines can become the target for terrorist activities. Click here for references to pipeline security in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In September 2001, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. This agreement was welcomed in a statement by the U.S. Department of State.
There seems to be a general preference for the existence of  multiple pipelines because this would allow the Caspian states to escape foreign influence and to facilitate their global economic integration. In a joint statement of U.S. President G.W. Bush and Russian President V. Putin at the U.S.-Russia summit of May 2002, a New Energy Dialogue between the United States and Russia was announced, centering on cooperation in their energy sectors by promoting joint projects. On November 22nd, a joint statement was made in St. Petersburg on the first results in the development of the U.S.-Russian Energy Dialogue.
 
Overview on Oil Exports Options in the Caspian Sea by the Energy Information Administration
Map of existing and proposed pipelines in the Caspian region


 Two main projects are emerging from the different options:

    The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Project: During the OSCE Istanbul Summit on November 17th, 1999 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan framework agreements were signed. This route would make it possible to link Georgia and Azerbaijan with NATO ally Turkey and, consequently, with the West. Despite objections based on its commercial viability, the construction of the pipeline will begin soon. An official ceremony was held in Baku in September 2002 to mark the start of its construction. The U.S. Department of State welcomed the official approval of the Georgian government of the BTC oil pipeline in a press statement. The Bush Administration is now actively supporting the development of a Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route, which would allow the inclusion of Kazakhstan in the BTC project.

    The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Project: The CPC Project involves the governments of Kazakhstan, Russia and Oman as well as American oil companies (Chevron and ExxonMobil). Click here for a press statement by U.S. Deputy Spokesman P. Reeker on CPC from November 2000. The CPC Project was officially launched in November 2001 and welcomed in a statement by U.S. President G.W. Bush as a means to enhance U.S. energy security. The CPC pipeline links the Tengiz oil field in western Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Anapa on the Black Sea Coast.

Click here for Energy Politics in the Caspian and Russia Coverage (RFE/RL).
Click here for a selection of Research Studies on Caspian Pipelines.


Support for NIS sovereignty

Until recently U.S. policy was to help the Newly Independent States (NIS) to assert their independence and sovereignty and to escape the influence of Russia, as expressed in a statement by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser for the NIS States S. Sestanovich on U.S. Policy Toward Russia from July 16th, 1998. The U.S. Department of State criticized the Russian Federation's threat to the territorial sovereignty of Georgia following the war in Chechnya. Click here for a selection of Press statements by the U.S. Department of State on the following topics:

    Russian Bombing of Georgia, August 24th, 2002
    Helicopters entering Georgian air space from Russian territory, November 28th, 2001
    Russian Imposition of Visa Regime for Georgia, December 5th, 2000
    OSCE Monitoring of Russian-Georgian Border, February 23rd, 2000


4. Cooperation with the European Union and the Council of Europe

Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe in April 1999. Accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been voted respectively on January 17th and January 25th, 2001.

The European Union (EU) signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia during the visit of the three Caucasian presidents in Luxembourg in April 1996, which entered into force on July 1st, 1999. The EU is active in the Caucasus along two different lines:

    Cooperation with the OSCE: The EU cooperates with the OSCE in the Caucasus by promoting confidence-building and through the implementation of special actions in conflict areas. The European Union supplied equipment to the Georgian Border Guard on the Chechen border in order to support OSCE monitoring operations and signed an assistance agreement with the OSCE in December 2001. The EU Presidency issued two declarations respectively on August 12th and August 28th on the violations of the Georgian airspace by military aircraft. The EU expressed its concern over the exacerbation of tension between Russia and Georgia and declared its support to the Georgian government in its efforts to restore order in the Pankisi valley.

    The TRACECA Programme: The EU is supporting the project of a transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia through the Caucasus. See the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for the Development of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, its Technical Annexes and the Baku Declaration issued at the Conference "TRACECA - Restoration of the Historic Silk Route" held in Baku on September 8th, 1998.


Speeches

    Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: Statement at the EAPC Summit Meeting, Prague, 22 November 2002
    Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia I. Menagarishvili: Speech at the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 19 September 2002
    Minister of Defence of Georgia D. Tevzadze: EAPCs Role in the International Fight Against Terrorism, Meeting of the EAPC in Defence Ministers session, Brussels, 7 June 2002
    Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia I. Menagarishvili: Statement at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Rekyavik, 15 May 2002
    Russian President V. Putin: Statement on Meeting with Georgian President E. Shevarnadze, Almaty, 1 March 2002 (Russian)
    Georgian President E. Shevarnadze and Secretary of Defense D. H. Rumsfeld: Joint Press Conference, Tbilisi, 15 December 2001
    Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.Menagarishvili: Speech at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, 7 December 2001
    Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: "Searching for Security in a Changing World", Harvard University, 3 October 2001
    Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Ivanov: Interview on Russian-Georgian relations, 28 May 2001
    Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Irakli Machavariani: Conflicts in Georgia: Effects on Energy Transport and Regional Security, Unpublished Rapporteur's Report, Caspian Studies Program, 24 May 2001
    Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Yakovenko: Interview on Russia's Position on Georgian-Abkhaz Settlement, 28 April 2001
    Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: Address to the Conference "Georgia and its Partners: Directions for the New Millennium", Tbilisi, 5 October 2000
    Secretary General of NATO G. Robertson at the Conference "Caucasus today: Perspectives of Regional Cooperation and Partnership with the NATO", Tbilisi, 26 September 2000


Research Studies

1. Georgia

    Larsson, R.L.: Georgia´s Missing Security Compass, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 July 2003  
    Darchiashvili, D.: Dilemmas for the Future of Georgia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 May 2003
    Devdariani, J.: Georgia on a Fault Line, Perspective, Vol. XIII/No. 3, January-February 2003
    Anjaparidze, Z.: Will Georgia cut the Pankisi knot?, The Jamestown Foundation Russian and Eurasian Review, Vol. 1/Issue 12, 19 November 2002
    Baran, Z.: Despite ongoing Russian Pressure, Time for Real Change in Georgia, CSIS - Georgia Update, 4 November 2002
    Di Puppo, L.: Die Pankisi Schlucht und die russisch-georgischen Beziehungen, antimilitarismus information 11/02, November 2002 (German only)
    Blank, S.: The Russian Bourbons: Civil-Military Relations and Pressure on Georgia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
    Blum, D.: The Russian-Georgian Crisis and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, CSIS Russia/Eurasia Program, PONARS Policy Memo No 252, October 2002 (pdf)
    Baev, P.: Russia´s Virtual War against Georgia: Risks of a PR Offensive, CSIS Russia/Eurasia Program, PONARS Policy Memo No 251, October 2002 (pdf)
    Devdariani, J.: Georgia Reacts to Russian Pressure, Perspective, Vol. XIII/No. 1, September-October 2002
    Hancilova, B.: Russia´s Grab for Pankisi: Domestic Diversion or Oil Politics?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 September 2002
    Bayran, Z.: Georgian-Russian Tension on the Rise, CSIS - Georgia Update, 21 August 2002
    Devdariani, J./ Hancilova, B.: Georgia´s Pankisi Gorge - Russian, U.S. and European Connections, Center for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No 23, June 2002 (pdf)
    Baev, P.: Georgia's Pankisi Gorge and the Global War against Terrorism, Summary of Event, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, 12 April 2002
    Baran, Z.: Tension Increasing in Abkhazia - Georgia Restates Commitment to Non-Military Solution, CSIS - Georgia Update, 1 April 2002
    Schmidt, Jürgen: Krieg gegen den Terrorismus im Südkaukasus ? Die USA entsenden Militärberater nach Georgien, SWP-Brennpunkte, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 22 March 2002 (German only)
    Baran, Z.: United States Will Help Georgia Fight Terrorism and Strengthen Internally, CSIS - Georgia Update, 4 March 2002
    Blandy, C.W.: Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees & Fighters, Conflict Studies Research Center, March 2002 (pdf)
    Kurtsikidze, S. / Chikovani, V.: Georgia´s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Spring 2002 (pdf)
    Areshidze, I.G.: Helping Georgia ?,Perspective, Vol. XII/No. 4, February-March 2002
    Blank, Stephen: The Prospects of Russian-American Partnership: The Georgian Litmus Test, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 30 January 2002
    Pataraia, T.: Impact of the Conflict in Chechnya on Georgian Security System, Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy and Development, 14 March 2001
    Feinberg, J.: The Armed Forces in Georgia, CDI Monograph, Center for Defense Information, March 1999 (pdf)

2. Regional conflicts

    Martirosyan, T.: Nagorno-Karabakh: Toward Stalemate or Settlement ?, The Jamestown Foundation, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol 2, Issue 1, 7 January 2003
    Ismailzade, F: Latest Efforts to Solve Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute Fails, Killing Talk of Economic Cooperation, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
    Martirosyan, T.: Land Swap in Nagorno-Karabakh: Much Noise over an Unrealistic Option, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 14 August 2002
    Ismailzade, F.: The OSCE Minsk Group: Is There Space for Improvement ?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 June 2002
    Shahnazarian, D.: Prospects for the Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh Problem, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 5 June 2002
    Baev, P./Koehler, J./Zuercher, C.: Civil Wars in the Caucasus, World Bank Development Economics Research Group (DECRG)/Yale University, UN Studies Program, 15 March 2002
    Cvetovski, N.: The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, Dissertation Aalborg University, 13 March 2002
    Sabanadze, N: International Involvement in the South Caucasus, European Center for Minority Issues, ECMI Working Paper # 15, February 2002 (pdf)
    Amirbayov, E.: Shusha's Pivotal Role in a Nagorno-Karabagh Settlement, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 6, December 2001 (pdf)
    Darchiashvili, D.: Some considerations about ways to solve the conflict in Abkhazia, Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy and Development, 14 March 2001
    Tavitian, N.: An irrestible force meets an immovable object: The Minsk Group negotiations on the status of Nagorno Karabakh, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Case Studies in International Diplomacy, Case 1/00, 2000 (pdf)
    Cohen, J. (ed): A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process, Accord 7, Conciliation Resources, September 1999 (Russian version)
    Coppieters, B. / Darchiashvili, D. / Akaba, N. (eds): Federal Practice - Exploring alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia, Vrije Universiteit Brussel University Press, 1999
    Carley, P.: Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 25, December 1998
    Coppieters, B. / Nodia, G. / Anchabadze, Y. (eds): Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, Caucasian Regional Studies Vol. 3, No 2 & 3, August 1998
    Derluguian, G.M.: The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since and the Soviet Collapse, in: Crawford, B. / Lipschutz, R.D. (ed.): The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence, University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #98, 1998 (pdf)
    Manutscharjan, A.: Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven, ZEI Discussion Paper C 18, Center for European Integration Studies, 1998 (pdf) (German only)
    Hansen, G.: Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners, Occasional Paper No 32, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1998 (pdf)
    Nodia, G.: Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Winter 1997-1998 (pdf)
    MacFarlane, N. / Minear, L. / Shenfield, S.: Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, Occasional Paper No 21, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996 (pdf)
    MacFarlane, N. / Minear, L: Humanitarian Action and Politics: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Occasional Paper No 25, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996 (pdf)

3. Southern Caucasus

    Huseyinov, T.: Towards Crafting a National Security Doctrine in Azerbaijan, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 26 March 2003
    Ismailova, G.: Will Azerbaijan Join The War on Iraq?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 29 January 2003
    Cohen, A.: Regional Security Implications of the Moscow Hostage-Taking, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 20 November 2002
    Devdariani, J./ Hancilova, B.: U.S. Involvement in Caucasian Security Architecture Grows, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 23 October 2002
    "South Caucasus and the Caspian: A View from Baku", Adress by I. Aliyev, Summary of Event, BSCIA Caspian Studies Program, 22 October 2002
    Linotte, D./ Aune, L.: The GUUAM Free Trade Agreement: A Concrete Step Forward, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 September 2002
    Blank, S.: The Future of Transcaspian Security, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Regional Studies, August 2002 (pdf)
    Valiyev, A.: Azerbaijani-Turkmen Relations: Quarreling Brothers, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 31 July 2002
    Sherr, J.: Democracy in the Black Sea Region: The Missing Link in Regional Security, Conflict Studies Research Center, July 2002 (pdf)
    Blank, S.: U.S. Military in Azerbaijan To Counter Iranian Threat, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 10 April 2002
    Ulusoy, H.: A New Formation in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR, Perceptions, Vol VI / No 4, December 2001- February 2002
    Ferrari, M.-P.: Les Républiques du Caucase entre passé soviétique et mondialisation, Mémoire, Institut Européen des Hautes Études Internationales Nices, 2002 (pdf) (French only)
    Black Sea Basin regional profile: The security situation and the region-building evolution of South-Eastern Europe, Institute for Security and International Studies, Research Study 13, January-March 2002
    Shaffer, B.: U.S. Policy toward the Caspian Region: Recommendations for the Bush Administration, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2001
    Baev, P.: Russia Refocuses its Policies in the Southern Caucasus, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2001
    U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian Region (Conference Report), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, 11 July 2001
    Fairbanks, C. / Nelson, R. / Starr, F. / Weisbrode, K.: Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States / Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, January 2001 (pdf)
    Valášek, T.: Military Cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova in the GUUAM Framework, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 2, December 2000
    Smith, M.: Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad, Conflict Studies Research Center, December 2000 (pdf)
    Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics, Conference Report, National Intelligence Council, October 2000
    Blank, S.: U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2000 (pdf)
    Herd, G. / Moustakis, F.: Black Sea Geopolitics: Dilemmas, Obstacles & Prospects, Conflict Studies Research Center, June 2000
    A Stability Pact for the Caucasus, Center for European Policy Studies, Working Document No.145, May 2000
    New Political Aspects of GUUAM development, Monitoring - Foreign & Security Policy of Ukraine, Occasional Paper 48/00, 2000
    Oliker, O.: Ukraine and the Caspian - An Opportunity for the United States, RAND - Center for Russia and Eurasia, 2000
    Lanskoy, M.: Anti-Terrorism as Pretext: Russia taking Aim at the South Caucasus?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 2000
    Thomas, T.: Russian National Interests and the Caspian Sea, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1999-2000
    Alieva, L.: Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in post-Soviet South Caucasus, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Winter 1999-2000 (pdf)
    Sokolsky, R. / Charlick-Paley, T.: NATO and Caspian security: A Mission Too Far?, RAND - Center for Russia and Eurasia, 1999
    Blank, S.: NATO after Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 1998 (pdf)
    Garnett, S.W.: Russia and its Borderlands: A Geography of Violence, U.S. Army War College, Parameters, Spring 1997
    Hopmann, T./Shenfield, S./Arel, D.: Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Regional and Global Security, Occasional Paper No 30, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1997 (pdf)

4. Caspian Pipelines

    Tsereteli, M.: Russia Close to Regaining Control over Strategic Georgian Assets, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 11 September 2002
    Aliriza, B. / Ciftci, S.: Turkey´s Caspian Energy Quandry, CSIS - Caspian Energy Update, 13 August 2002 (pdf)
    Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey Pipelines project - Georgian Section, International Fact Finding Mission Preliminary Report, CEE Bankwatch Network, 31 July 2002 (pdf)
    Allison, G. / Grennan, J.: U.S. Policy on Russian and Caspian Oil Exports: Addressing America's Oil Addiction, Discussion Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2002 (pdf)
    Spector, R.: The North-South Transport Corridor, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 3 July 2002
    Müller, F.: Entwicklungspotentiale und Wirtschaftsinteressen, Jour Fixe Zentralasien / Kaukasus, SWP-Brennpunkte, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 16 June 2002 (German only)
    Kiesling, L. / Becker, J.: Russia's Role in the Shifting World Oil Market, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 8, May 2002
    Kochladze, M.: Pocketing Caspian Black Gold: Who are the Real Beneficiaries of Oil Infrastructure Development in Georgia and Azerbaijan?, Transnational Institute / CEE Bankwatch Network, April 2002 (pdf)
    Udum, S.: The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Ressources: A Challenge for Turkish Foreign Policy, Perceptions, Vol VI / No 4, December 2001- February 2002
    Cutler, R.: The Caspian Pipeline Consortium Beats the Skeptics, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 12 September 2001
    McKeeby, D.: "Crude Business": Corruption and Caspian Oil, CSIS - Caspian Energy Update, 1 September 2001
    Pamir, N.: Turkey: The Key to Caspian Oil and Gas, IASPS Strategic Research Papers, September 2001 (pdf)
    Allison, G. / Van Buskirk, E.: Mini-Case and Illustrative Paradigm, U.S. Policy on Caspian Energy Development and Exports, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, May 2001 (pdf)
    Walters, J.: Caspian Oil and Gas: Mitigating Political Risks for Private Participation, World Bank Group, June 2000 (pdf)
    Cordersman, A.H.:  The US Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia and Iran, CSIS, 27 April 2000 (pdf)
    Rubin, Vadim: The Geopolitics of Energy Development in the Caspian Region: Regional Cooperation or Conflict ?, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), December 1999 (pdf)
    Rosenthal, S.: NATO, Russia, and Oil pipelines, Stratfor, 15 June 1999
    Joseph, J.: Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration's Fight for Baku-Ceyhan, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Case Studies in International Diplomacy, Case 1/99, 1999 (pdf)
    Cohen, A.: The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1065, 25 January 1996 (pdf)
    Raptis, K.: Nagorno Karabakh and the Eurasian Transport Corridor, Occasional Paper, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), March 1998 (pdf)
    Oil and Gas Resources of the Fergana Basin (Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, December 1994 (pdf)



Parliamentary Reports

    The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly oh the Council of Europe, 13 March 2003  
    New Developments in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, Political Committee Reports, WEU Assembly, 4 December 2001. Excerpts on Conflict in Chechnya and Russia's Relations with Georgia.
    The Role of NATO in the Security of the Black Sea Region, Rose Roth Seminar, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 25-27 October 2001
    NATO Relations with EAPC Member Countries, Political Committee Reports, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 2000
    The Conflict in Chechnya, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 25 January 2000
    The Security Landscape in Azerbaijan, Secretariat Report of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 12-14 May 1999
    Azerbaijan's necessity of a special partnership role with NATO, Secretariat Report of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 22-24 October 1998
    The situation in central Asia and the Caucasus and European Security [Part 1] [Part 2] [Part 3] , Political Committee Reports, WEU Assembly, 19 November 1997
    Economic and Strategic Stakes in Caspian Energy Markets, Economic Committee Reports, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 23 September 1999
    Conflicts in Transcaucasia, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 10 April 1997 (pdf)
    Report on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 17 October 1994 (pdf)

Instanbul Decennial Summit Declaration of the BSEC: "Looking Beyond Ten Years of Cooperation and Progress",
Istanbul, 25 June 2002


    1. We, The Heads Of State Or Government Of The Member States Of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), Met In Istanbul On 25 June 2002, On The Occasion Of The Tenth Anniversary Of The Founding Of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, To Review The Contribution The Process Has Made Over The Last Ten Years To Developing And Strengthening The Good Neighbourly Relations, Regional, Interregional Cooperation, Integration, Peace, Stability And Security And To Consider New Opportunities And Ways Of Further Improvements To Meet The Challenges Ahead.

    2. Over The Past Decade The BSEC Has Proved Its Value As A Forum Of Trust, Understanding And Cooperation. It Has Fostered Significant Progress In Its Member States' Policies On Promoting Democracy, Market Economy And Open Society And, Through This, Has Supported The Efforts Towards A Better Positioning Of Our Region In Today's World, In Which Countries Are Moving Ever Closer Towards Openness And Economic Integration.

    3. Our Successes Justify And Encourage Us To Look To The Future Not Only With Confidence But Also With Great Expectations. The Black Sea Region, With Its Position Right At The Heart Of Eurasia, Stands To Reap Great Benefits From Its Increased Global Geostrategic Importance. The Natural Resources Of Our Countries, Our Solid Scientific And Technological Base, Our Rich Cultures And Traditions, Our Highly Educated, Skilled And Creative People Will All Be The Vehicles Of The Success Of The BSEC Region. Our Organization Will Be Needed, Even More Than Before, To Help Us Maximize Our Common Values And Interests, And We Reinforce Our Commitment To Further Promote The BSEC Process As A Reliable Means To Embrace New Domains Of Interaction WhilE Deepening The Cooperation In The Existing Ones.

    4. The Political, Economic And Security Developments In Europe Clearly Indicate That Peace On The Continent Depends On The Stability And Prosperity Of Its Regions. They Also Demonstrate That The Black Sea Region Is In Need Of Further Efforts Towards Security And Stability. We Encourage The BSEC Council Of Ministers Of Foreign Affairs To Consider Ways And Means Of Enhancing Contribution Of The BSEC To Strengthening Security And Stability In The Region.

    5. The BSEC Was Initiated Ten Years Ago By The Profound Changes In Europe That Opened Up Unprecedented Opportunities For Cooperation Among Our Nations. We Acknowledge Today That The Challenge Remains How Best To Utilize This Potential And Translate It Into Increased Interaction For The Benefit Of Our Peoples. In This Context We Reaffirm Our Determination To Further Implement The Provisions Of The BSEC Charter With A View To Realizing Its Resources To The Maximum Extent And Implementing Its Principles And Objectives Into Every-day Practice.

    6. We Welcome With High Satisfaction The Adoption Of The BSEC Economic Agenda And The Decision On The Establishment Of The BSEC Project Development Fund On The Basis Of Voluntary Contributions And The Related Institutional Capacity Intended To Facilitate The Elaboration And Promotion Of Projects With High Regional Cooperation Impact And Call On The Member States To Actively Contribute To Its Functioning. In This Respect We Believe That Our Organization Should Further Consider Ways And Take Appropriate Actions To Function More Effectively And Efficiently. To This End, We Task The BSEC Council Of Ministers Of Foreign Affairs To Enhance The Coordinating Functions Of The BSEC PERMIS And Its Secretary General, In Line With The Provisions Of The BSEC Economic Agenda.

    7. As The Dynamics Of The Emerging New European Architecture Open Up The Potential For Effective Partnerships With BSEC, The BSEC Member States Attach Importance To Their Policies In Building Up A Tangible Relationship With The EU. In This Respect, We Will Continue The Efforts To Ensure Coordination And Cooperation Between The BSEC And The EU. For This Purpose, We Call On The BSEC Council Of Ministers Of Foreign Affairs And The EU To Undertake Concrete Steps To Advance This Cooperation.

    8. Recognizing That Any Dispute Or Conflict In The Region Impedes Cooperation, We Stress The Need To Solve Such Disputes Or Conflicts On The Basis Of The Norms And Principles Of International Law.

    9. We Firmly Condemn Terrorism In All Its Forms And Manifestations As A Profound Challenge To Peace And Security And A Highly Dangerous Threat To Political, Economic And Social Stability Of States And The International Community As A Whole, Adversely Affecting The Market Economies And The Development Of Multilateral And Bilateral Cooperation. We Reaffirm Our Resolution To Take All The Necessary Steps, While Firmly Respecting Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms As Enshrined In Applicable Instruments, Countering Terrorism And Other Linked Illegal Activities. We Deem It Imperative That The Relevant BSEC Organs And National Competent Authorities Enhance The Implementation Of The BSEC Agreement On Cooperation In Combating Crime, In Particular In Its Organized Forms And, FurtheRmore, Consider New Means Of Cooperation Within The Mandate Of The BSEC.

    10. We Declare Solemnly That BSEC May Serve As A Testimony And An Example For The Harmonious Cooperation Among States Having Varying Spiritual And Cultural Backgrounds. We Are Convinced That This Diversity Is An Essential Asset Of Our Organization And Enrichment For Our Countries And Peoples, Promoting Better Understanding Among Civilizations.

    11. We Highly Appreciate The Ground Covered By The Organization In Such A Short Span Of Time And Would Like To Amplify Our Unswerving Political Support For The Future Success Of This Promising And Dynamic Organization.

    12. We Express Our Gratitude To The Government And People Of The Republic Of Turkey For The Warm Hospitality And Excellent Organization Of The Summit On The Tenth Anniversary Of The BSEC At Its Birthplace, Istanbul.

Statement of Georgian Minister of Defense
Lt. Gen. D. Tevzadze on the Blackseafor,
EAPC Meeting of the Defense Ministers, Brussels,
8 June 2001


The BLACKSEAFOR is a regional, stand-alone and at the same time a transparent arrangement. The activity of the BLACKSEAFOR is neither directed against any state nor intended to form a military alliance against any state or a group of states.

The mission of the force will be to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states as well as to improve peace and stability in the region, through the enhancement of co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces. According to these missions the nature of its tasks will be as follows:

a. Exercises;
b. Search and Rescue (SAR) operations;
c. Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations;
d. Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Operations;
e. Environmental Protection;
f. Goodwill Visits;
g. Any other tasks agreed by all the Parties.

When directed by the Foreign/Defense Ministers or their authorized representatives, the Force may conduct Peace Support Operations in support of United Nations Security Council and OSCE Resolutions, as well as operations against smuggling, organized crime and terrorism

The engagement in this new initiation of all Black Sea littoral countries gives a firm belief that BLACKSEAFOR will be a good contribution to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and particularly to its Southern flank in the Black Sea region.

The participation of Russian Federation in this agreement represents strong basis for BLACKSEAFOR to promote the cooperation and stability within the Black Sea basin area.


------------

full text:


Statement
by Lt. Gen. David Tevzadze, Minister of Defence of Georgia

Mr. Chairman,
Dear Colleagues,
The EAPC provides an excellent framework for dialogue and consultation between NATO and Partners, thereby enhancing transparency and building confidence. Military-to-military contacts through joint activities such as military exercises serve as a meaningful part of the process of confidence building among nations in various regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. This month, Georgia hosts Cooperative Partner-2001, which is the first NATO/Partner full-scale field exercise in South Caucasus.

In the context of PfP's contributions to Euro-Atlantic crisis management capabilities, I would like to mention new initiative of Black Sea littoral countries - the BLACKSEAFOR (Naval Co-operation Task Force). The agreement on the establishment of the force was signed in Istanbul on April 2, 2001. Preparations are currently under-way to activate the force in September 2001.

The BLACKSEAFOR is a regional, stand-alone and at the same time a transparent arrangement. The activity of the BLACKSEAFOR is neither directed against any state nor intended to form a military alliance against any state or a group of states. It's mission is to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states as well as to promote peace and stability in the region, through the enhancement of co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces.

We welcome increased emphasis of PfP program in promoting defence reform, which was several times outlined by the Secretary General in his statements. We consider PARP Ministerial Guidance as an important tool in assisting us to review our Partnership Goals in a new PARP cycle. We believe that tailoring our IPP and harmonisation of the various PfP programs with PARP is in the best interests of all the Partners. It helps us in focusing on defence reform by exploring opportunities of various PfP programs and tools.

We welcome continuous focus in EAPC format on promoting regional security cooperation in South East Europe and Caucasus. The security in the Caucasus region cannot be separated from the European security in large. However, the events in South Eastern Europe show that a failure to fully commit and provide unconditional and comprehensive support in building strong, democratic, and stable states could turn apart whole Europe. Therefore, the regional cooperation in South Caucasus in EAPC format needs to be re-invigorated not only within Ad Hoc Working Group format. EAPC's wider approach in promoting stability and resolving conflicts in the region is needed. The appointment of Special Representative of the Secretary General for Caucasus region could be one of the first steps in this direction.

Thank you for your attention.

Complementary material to the Statement

Since the inception of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Georgia has year-by-year tried to gain its foothold in the European community and to contribute to the overall European security system.

Currently Georgia's defence and security institutions are under the reorganisation process. The reforms are under-way in the Ministry of Defence according to ISAB (International Security Advisory Board) and USECOM recommendations. Focus is on improving training and education systems, developing logistics, command, control, communications and intelligence systems compatible with NATO forces, with special attention to PARP declared units.

Our goal is an establishment of small, mobile, high readiness and cost effective army, with modern equipment, built along NATO standards and interoperable with NATO forces. But the reduction of the Armed Forces requires the special social measures to be taken for helping the exempted military personnel to be integrated as less painfully as possible. Keeping in mind hard budgetary deficiency the implementation of this task is quite a dilemma.

Despite the various impeding factors (mainly financial) considerable progress has been achieved:

· General Staff was functionally separated from the Ministry of Defence;
· General staff structure was built along western joint staff model.

Democratic control of the armed forces and civil-military relations are another pressing issues on the agenda. Increased civilian control on defence planning and more transparent defence expenditure are an important step forward in building new type of military in Georgia.

Our MoD staff previously was manned by military personnel. It is not a case anymore - we are trying to introduce more and more young and educated civil servants in order to replace military in a positions, which are not directly related to pure war fighting jobs. Deputy minister is already a civilian political appointee. By the year 2004 the staff of the Ministry of Defence will be mostly civilian, including minister himself.

According to the recommendations, the Defence Resource Management Division has moved from the General Staff to the MoD staff under the supervision of the Minister of Defence. Together with the representatives of the US Institute for Defense Analysis, Defence Resource Management Division determined specific priorities based on which the 2001-2010 Ministerial Guidance for the development of the Georgian Armed Forces was elaborated. This document includes short-term 2000-2005 and long-term 2006-2010 development programs.

One of the main priorities for us is also the development of the Georgian Joint Military Academy's curriculum in compliance with the model of the Sandhurst Academy, UK. That means the creation of one-year officers' training course. Western-trained Georgian military instructors will manage the training process.

At the same time, rigorous English language training is underway, which is a basement for deepening co-operation with NATO and Partner Armed Forces, and provides better opportunities in conducting joint exercises as well as enhances interoperability with NATO forces.

Georgia's participation in the PARP process underlines the strong determination of its government to complete successfully the reforms of armed forces. The first success in implementation of PGs was the Georgian platoon, which carries out peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. We are certain to continue on this direction with plans to introduce a light infantry company (11 Bde) by the end of 2001, and by the end of 2002 light infantry battalion, for NATO-led PSO. However, scarce resources available for our military makes extremely hard to fulfill the PGs in time.

PfP remains a valuable practical mechanism, which facilitates the accomplishment of objectives set by the military reforms. But the program is also a good tool for strengthening Georgia's political ties with the North Atlantic Alliance. Our continuous engagement in PfP is considered as of great importance for further NATO-Georgia relations.

The same reason raises the importance of the PFP Exercise "Cooperative Partner-2001", which is the first NATO/Partner full-scale live exercise in South Caucasus. To be conducted during 10-23 of June 2001, "Cooperative Partner" will be the first exercise held in Georgia under the Partnership for Peace Program.

The emphasis during this exercise will be placed upon enhancing greater understanding and confidence between NATO and participating Partner Nations in the planning and conducting Humanitarian Assistance Operations.

A commitment to conduct such an exercise, in terms of its complex logistics, was not an easy decision, because of really limited military and financial resources. Nevertheless, the decision was made, as one more clear expression of the national will to strengthen the ties of cooperation and friendship, to enhance its military capabilities in order to contribute to the international peace and stability.

In the context of regional cooperation it's worth mentioning about the BLACKSEAFOR (the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group) - the new initiation of Black Sea littoral countries. The agreement on the establishment of the force was signed in Istanbul on April 2, 2001. Preparations are currently under-way to activate the force in September 2001. The states parties to that treaty are:
· Bulgaria;
· Georgia;
· Romania;
· Russian Federation;
· Turkey;
· Ukraine;

The BLACKSEAFOR is a regional, stand-alone and at the same time a transparent arrangement. The activity of the BLACKSEAFOR is neither directed against any state nor intended to form a military alliance against any state or a group of states.

The mission of the force will be to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states as well as to improve peace and stability in the region, through the enhancement of co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces.
According to these missions the nature of its tasks will be as follows:

a. Exercises;
b. Search and Rescue (SAR) operations;
c. Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations;
d. Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Operations;
e. Environmental Protection;
f. Goodwill Visits;
g. Any other tasks agreed by all the Parties.

When directed by the Foreign/Defense Ministers or their authorized representatives, the Force may conduct Peace Support Operations in support of United Nations Security Council and OSCE Resolutions, as well as operations against smuggling, organized crime and terrorism

The engagement in this new initiation of all Black Sea littoral countries gives a firm belief that BLACKSEAFOR will be a good contribution to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and particularly to its Southern flank in the Black Sea region.

The participation of Russian Federation in this agreement represents strong basis for BLACKSEAFOR to promote the cooperation and stability within the Black Sea basin area.

Georgia considers the implementation of the obligations undertaken by Russia on the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999 as the top priority for it's security and expects constructive collaboration from Russian counterparts, which will be the large contribution to Georgian-Russian further cooperation.

Currently the agreement is achieved on full transfer of Vaziani military base (situated near Tbilisi) to the Georgian side till July 01 of 2001. The next round of negotiations about the duration of Russian forces presence in Batumi and Akhalkalaki is scheduled on the second half of June of 2001.

The support from international community in dialogue with Russia is vital for Georgia. We believe this support will continue to grow in future. The security in the Caucasus region cannot be separated from the European security in large. Instability in one part of the Euro-Atlantic area threatens the stability of the whole region.

Membership Action Plan launched on the Washington Summit, gives an invaluable opportunity and useful guidance (regulation) to the aspirant countries for bringing its political, economic, military, security, legal and other structures in compliance with NATO standards, preparing them towards prospective NATO membership.

Georgia aspires to play a significant role in enhancing the stability and mutual trust in our turbulent region. To transform Caucasus into the reliable and stable region, free of violence and capable to contribute to the peaceful development of the Euro-Atlantic area is the highest priority for Georgia.