NATO HQ Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
Dear Secretary General,
Dear Colleagues,
Over the recent years the EAPC/PfP cooperation has become a permanent feature of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. One could hardly overestimate the role of this partnership both in fostering mutual confidence throughout the continent and in developing operational capabilities to jointly address threats and risks to our common security. Participation of Georgia in the International Peacekeeping Operations in support of peace in Kosovo has been a successful trial of practical results yielded in the "Partnership for Peace" framework.
In the framework of our efforts to achieve lasting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area free of spheres of influence and dividing lines, we attach importance to making full use of the consultation mechanisms laid down in the EAPC Basic Document.
Mr. Chairman,
As it is evidently seen in the Progress Report on development of the NATO's South-East Europe Initiative (SEEI), collective efforts of the Euro-Atlantic nations have ensured the success of regional cooperation and contributed to the democratic changes in this part of Europe. We strongly believe that this experience could be employed in other regions as well, namely in the Caucasus - through developing the idea on stability arrangements for the Caucasus" which we all have been actively considering of late.
The EAPC activities in the second half of 2000, reflected in the Chairman's report, have to be considered as useful and productive. We also support the updated EAPC Action Plan. We appreciate the special emphasis in this document on regional issues related to South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Georgia strongly supports the retention of the transatlantic link as a vital element of security and stability in Europe.
Mr. Chairman,
The enhancement of EAPC and PfP serves as clear evidence of the right course for the security of our common house - the Euro-Atlantic area. Georgia considers the EAPC to be instrumental in reviewing and solving numerous stability and security problems in this area. Therefore, we support the idea on raising the profile of the EAPC. We especially encourage proposals to pay more attention to certain regions of the Euro-Atlantic space. In this regard, the EAPC has already provided a useful forum for developing regional security cooperation practices, namely through the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Caucasus. The steps already taken in this context have proven to be small but still very productive and coherent for future larger cooperation in the South Caucasus.
In our view, the EAPC along with PfP, can make a substantial contribution to address the challenges to the regional stability, complementing the efforts of the other international organizations, e.g. the UN, the OSCE, etc. One of them is of course conflict prevention. The importance and effectiveness of the last year's discussions held within the EAPC format on the tensions on the Chechen segment of Georgian-Russian border has to be stated in this respect. I would like herewith to draw your attention to a positive role that PfP can play in terms of improving national capabilities in the sphere of border control, particularly, in preventing illegal and uncontrolled trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
While co-operation between states is elevated to the completely new level to achieve the long-term security and stability, it seems awkward to have to stress on the basic principles of interstate relations. In this regard, we must regrettably note the fact that Russia has unilaterally granted special visa privileges to the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, that can adversely affect the regional stability. We call upon Russia to look jointly for a solution of this issue through negotiations.
We appreciate the attention paid by the NATO/EAPC to the arms control issues. I would like to note the progress achieved in the implementation of the Istanbul Joint Statement provisions on the reduction and withdrawal of Russian military equipment (TLE) from Georgia. Herewith, I would like to stress the importance of transparency of the military equipment reduction process as well as complete withdrawal of the bases.
We are delighted to underline the progress achieved in the TLE withdrawal process from the Gudauta military base. We appreciate NAC Defence Ministerial Communique which welcomes the efforts of the Russian side. We hope that the process of the TLE withdrawal from Gudauta will be completed till the end of this year as envisaged by the Istanbul Joint Statement.
The Georgian position remains unchanged: the final state of the Russian military forces reduction process must be a complete liberation of the territory of Georgia from foreign military presence.
We count on the support of the EAPC Member States and consider that their active involvement in the process of implementation of the provisions of the Adapted CFE Treaty and agreements reached in Istanbul in 1999 would significantly contribute to its success.
In conclusion, allow me to state once again that Georgia, as a partner of the Alliance, will actively co-operate within the EAPC in the years to come.
Thank you.
Partnership for Peace: Framework Document
Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.
This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.
In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.
They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commit- ments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.
The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:
facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
maintenance of the capability and readiness to con- tribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.
In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.
The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:
those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.
In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:
develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.
NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
Regretfully should be stated, that in the certain political circles of Russia the forcing of inten-
sity around of events in Abkhazia and Georgia as a whole does not end.
The statement of the representative of the MFA of the Russian Federation from March, 21,
2002 is an evident confirmation of the fact.
Uncompromisingly adhering to a principle of peaceful settlement of Abkhazian conflict, con-
sidering political methods of its resolving as nonalternative, the government of Georgia, cer-
tainly, is concerned by the occuring in the zone of conflict with acts of violence, absence of
the elementary law, order and conditions of safety, first of all for the refugees, who have come
back to their native places are suffering of it.
The Georgian side repeatedly stated and states a issue on acceptance of drastic steps, includ-
ing change of mandate for Collective Peace Keeping Forces (CPKF), and also some other
actions to achieve the consent to which realization, till now it is not possible.
Proceeding from this, the Georgian Side can not consider reasonable the accusations put for-
ward to its address. In opinion of the Georgian Side, categorical unilateral estimations con-
taining in the application on the facts which investigation is not conducted yet especially are
groundless, that only emphasizes tendentiousness of its authors.
It should be known to the authors of the statement, that an original cause of preservation and
escalation of intensity in the zone of conflict, is absence of any progress of political settlement
during long period of time as which basis the appropriate offers on differentiation of the con-
stitutional authorities between Tbilisi and Sukhumi should serve. For nobody is a secret by
whom and by what means are blocked the achievements of the arrangements under these of-
fers.
In connection with the aforesaid, the accusation of official Tbilisi in equivocacy of its position
and doubt in sincerity of its intents is, at least, incorrect.
Concerning the information of allegedly groundless assertions of presence of international
terrorists, Tbilisi Authorities consider that Moscow should have listened to this reports and do
not reject them, from the very beginning, as the appearing of possible refuge of international
terrorists, practically in uncontrolling zone can cause serious problems first of all to Russia.
In this connection, it is regretful, that the certain representatives of political circles of Russia
are concerned more of activization of the American - Georgian military cooperation, than
availability of the centers of tension in the region.
Because of it, the statement of the representative of the MFA of Russia cannot be perceived
but as containing ungrounded, irresponsible accusations which can cause only serious damage
to the Russian - Georgian dialogue and prevent peaceful settlement of conflicts.
Tbilisi, March, 22, 2002.
On the 27th of November, 21:20 hours, six Su-25 type Russian military jets have violated
Georgian airspace and bombed territories adjacent to the village Birkiani, Akhmeta district.
These jets penetrated the Georgian airspace for the distance of 50 km and remained there for
about 30 minutes. At the same night Russian military helicopters conducted several air strikes
on the territory adjacent to Chechen and Ingush segments of the Georgian-Russian State Bor-
der, including outskirts of villages Terga, Arkhoti, Kue, Zemo Omalo, Akhieli and Amgha.
The data on the human loss and property damage caused by the air strikes will be adjusted
later.
Today on 12:35 the intrusion of two Su-25-type military jets en route from the Russian Fed-
eration was marked in Kodori Gorge. Jets flew over Mestia and returned back.
Such actions of the Russian military forces can only be evaluated as an undisguised aggres-
sion against the sovereign neighboring State.
Simultaneously, especially alarming is that aforesaid is conducted on the threshold of CIS
Summit and planned meeting between the Presidents of Georgia and the Russian federation.
We cannot exclude that the above mentioned actions are attempts of the destructive forces
aimed against possible positive outcome of the Presidential meeting.
The Georgian side regards that due to disdain of the numerous Georgian protests regarding
the facts of encroachment on the sovereignty by the Russian political leadership the aforesaid
became possible. The outcome of this acts conducted by the Russian side, if not suppressed on
time, may only deepen the instability in the Caucasus region. One must not neglect such
threats. The International Community must raise its voice against the coarse violation of in-
ternationally accepted basic principles of peaceful co-existence.
The ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses utmost resentment and while appealing
to the Russian leadership categorically demands to cease the oft-recurring aggression against
Georgia.
Herewith, if this kind of actions will continue, Georgia reserves the right to conduct adequate
steps provided by the norms of international law.
On October 9, 2001, at 5:10am, unidentified combat helicopters appeared from the direction
of the village of Sakeni, flew over the village of Omarishara and bombed the Kodori Gorge
(area of the villages of Lata and Chkhalta).
The same day, at approximately 6:00am, four SU-25 jets flew over the village of Sakeni, car-
ried out a massive bomb attack on the nearby barns and other summer utilities of the village
and proceeded to the direction of the Russian Federation. Several bombs were also dropped 2
kilometers away from the village of Omarishara. The damage assessment team has been dis-
patched to the region.
The violation of the airspace of Georgia and the bomb attack on its territory is viewed by the
Georgian Government as an infringement on its sovereignty and an attempt by some forces to
subvert the process of the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia.
The Government of Georgia deems it necessary to remind the international community that
the bomb attacks against Georgia have repeatedly taken place in the past as well, but regretta-
bly, in spite of the protests expressed by Georgia, these facts were dismissed without appro-
priate reaction.
It is not a mere coincidence that these actions are being carried out at the time of intense and
spurious anti-Georgian propagandist campaign launched by the mass media of the Russian
Federation.
There is no doubt that Georgia is facing a large-scale and a well-planned provocation. If this
provocation is not curbed immediately, it may well grow into the aggression aimed against the
Georgian State.
Georgia calls on the Russian Federation to conduct a thorough investigation with a view to
ascertaining the movement of the military aircraft in the airspace of the Russian Federation
which carried out attacks on the Georgian territory and also demands that the Russian side
prevent the use of its airspace by the Abkhaz separatists.
Georgia expresses its readiness to cooperate with any international commission whatsoever
which would investigate the latest developments in Abkhazia, Georgia, including the tragic
crash of the helicopter of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in
Abkhazia (Georgia).
The Georgian Government expresses its resentment and protest at the above mentioned inci-
dent and appeals to the international community, United Nations and OSCE to take all neces-
sary measures to firmly condemn such provocative actions in order to prevent the further de-
terioration of the situation in Georgia.
There are more similarities than differences between Pankisi and the rest of Georgia.
Bradley Jardine, Neil Hauer Jun 19, 2018
“They say we are all terrorists,” says Fatima, a guesthouse owner near Georgia’s border with Chechnya. “We are just ordinary people. Ordinary people with a proud culture and history.”
Fatima is not her real name: she requested anonymity after a pattern of what she calls “disappointing coverage” by journalists.
This is the Pankisi Gorge, home of the Kists, a minority group closely related to Chechens. The region has become notorious in recent years, with media coverage almost uniformly depicting it as a hotbed of Islamist radicalism. One American analyst went as far as to dub Pankisi the “Harvard of terrorist upbringing.”
The region's Muslim character is unmistakable. There is a prominent new mosque on the main street of Duisi, Pankisi’s largest village. Women wear headscarves and young men have pronounced beards and long bangs, as is fashionable among Chechen men these days.
But there are more similarities than differences between Pankisi and the rest of Georgia. Local cuisine is replete with Georgian classics, albeit with occasional twists: for example, Kists make the legendary Georgian khinkali dumplings with a filling of nettles instead of the standard meat mixture. Villagers sew handicrafts and clothing popular throughout the country, including the iconic Kakhetian felt caps.
In the early 2000s, the region became a base for Chechen separatists in their war with Russia, resulting in tense relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. More recently, at least 50 Pankisi natives have traveled to Syria to fight alongside ISIS, including Tarkhan Batirashvili, better known as Umar al-Shishani, the group’s so-called “minister of war.”
But locals insist that violence and radicalism are atypical and an increasing number of them, including Fatima, are leading the charge to change perceptions through one of their culture’s most sacred values: hospitality.
Fatima is the proprietor of Pankisi’s first real guesthouse, which she opened in 2013 after she had grown increasingly frustrated by the way her homeland was being portrayed.
“The government is unwilling to help us, so I decided to do something myself,” she says.
Pankisi is rarely advertised as a tourist destination, Fatima says. Local tourist companies and authorities often discourage people from visiting. “Please be careful,” is the response one often hears from Georgians when announcing travel plans to the area.
The region is also noticeably missing from popular travel guides, such as Lonely Planet. Fatima notes happily, though, that the region has appeared in the Bradt travel guide to Georgia since 2015 after she met with the author.
Despite the lack of publicity, more than 10 guesthouses are now running in the gorge, and the operators opened a new tourism development association in March. On a recent visit to the region, Eurasianet encountered American, Japanese and even Malaysian tourists out enjoying Pankisi's stunning views.
“At first we only got a handful of journalists coming through to stay with us, but now we are getting hundreds of tourists interested in nature walks and extreme sports,” Fatima says.
But tourism continues to face an uphill struggle as the perception persists that Pankisi is a hotbed of terrorism. “Most journalists know what they want to write before they even come here,” Fatima says. “They never consider the ways in which their words might hurt us.”
Sulkhan Bordzikashvili, a Tbilisi-based journalist and activist who is a Pankisi native, agrees. “Unfortunately, most of the time the gorge is only mentioned in connection with terrorism.”
Negative stereotypes again came to the fore in December 2017, following a widely criticized counter-terrorism operation by Georgia’s security services that led to the death of teenager Temirlan Machalikashvili.
In the immediate aftermath of the fatal operation, Fatima's guesthouse issued an email to journalists who were contacting her for accommodation: “This is not a good time to visit,” it said. “The media and state have caused significant damage to the reputation of the Kist people through sensationalist reporting. Moreover, they have nearly destroyed the infant tourism scene, which a few people have worked so hard to develop.”
But Bordzikashvili remains optimistic. “It will be difficult to change [these stereotypes], but I think it is possible” he says.
One way to do this would be to increase awareness of Pankisi's religious tolerance and healthy interactions with its neighbors. While there are no Christian residents left in the central village of Jokolo, its 19th-century St. George's Church is maintained by a local Kist family. They do not use the building themselves, but keep it in good repair and unlock it for visiting Georgians wishing to pray inside.
The region also has Islamic traditions that it can show off to tourists, such as the Marshua Kavkaz (“Peace to the Caucasus”) vocal ensemble. The all-female group has performed throughout Georgia and internationally, and every Friday they conduct the sacred Sufi zikr chant at Duisi's old mosque.
Meanwhile, locals are proud of the levels of human development their small region has achieved. “The children here have some of the highest test scores in all of Georgia,” Fatima says with evident pride.
Much of this can be attributed to the Roddy Scott Foundation, a British NGO that provides English classes for children. Fatima has recruited guides for tours of Pankisi from among these students, who themselves recognize how important the Foundation has been.
“They are the whole reason we speak good English,” a 16-year-old guide tells us as we stroll through Duisi.
It is telling, however, that most of these successes have been achieved without the involvement of the Georgian government. The only real signs of Tbilisi’s influence are the police station at the entrance to the gorge and dozens of large pipes along the Alazani River, part of a controversial dam project in the region.
Opposition to the dam has been near-universal in Pankisi, with several rallies already held against it.
“Although the absolute majority of the population opposes the dam, the process of building it is still ongoing,” says Bordzikashvili. “Moreover, representatives of various government institutions and private companies are trying to silence citizens who openly protest its construction.”
Fatima fears the project will be yet another state-driven blow to local tourism.
“We are against the construction of the dam because it will impact the quality of our water, the environment, tourism,” she says.
The gorge’s residents have steadfastly maintained their valley and their customs for nearly two centuries. Their language attests to this, with the local dialect containing words no longer commonly used in standard Chechen. But as Pankisi opens to the world, Kist culture is facing new challenges.
“Do you like Snoop Dogg?” the young guide asks excitedly. “He is so good, but his lyrics are ‘smoke weed every day.’”
“Don’t your parents get angry?” his friend interjects.
“They don’t speak any English,” he laughs.
Bradley Jardine is a freelance journalist who covers the Caucasus. Neil Hauer is an independent security analyst focused on Syria, Russia, and the Caucasus.
Bradley Jardine is a freelance journalist who covers the Caucasus.
Neil Hauer is a Tbilisi-based writer.
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