CSCE-Helsinki Summit 1992
Chapter III of the Helsinki Document
The Challenges of Change, 9-10 July 1992

(52) The CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities. Other institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), may also be asked by the CSCE to support peacekeeping in the CSCE region.

last modified: 18 November 2005

 

1. Background

1.1 Security Issues in the Region

The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

In July 1992 Abkhazian separatists declared their independence from Georgia, leading to a war between the Abkhazians and Georgian Government forces. Supported by volunteers, partly from other countries, Abkhazian forces gained territory within their region. Looking for a way out, Georgia asked Russia to mediate as a regional power. This gave Russia the opportunity to expand its influence on the non-CIS state Georgia. After the failure of the first agreement between the separatists, Georgia and Russia, a second ceasefire was signed by all three parties on July 27th, 1993. The agreement favours the separatist side, which at the present moment controls all of Abkhazia. On May 14th, 1994, the Abkhazian and Georgian parties met in Moscow and signed an agreement on the deployment of CIS peacekeeping troops in the region.


The Georgian-Ossetian conflict

Following ethnic tensions and the abolition of the autonomous status of South Ossetia by the Georgian government in December 1990, Ossetian separatists began an armed revolt in the spring of 1992. They demanded the unification of North and South Ossetia, with the consequence of integrating the region into the Russian Federation. As a result of negotiations between Georgian President Shevarnadze and Russian President Yeltsin a ceasefire agreement was signed in June 1992, and a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was deployed.
 

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh started in 1988 following a vote by the regional Soviet authorities, that mandated the transfer of the predominantly ethnic Armenian province from Azerbaijan to Armenia. As a result, war broke out in 1989 between Azerbaijani forces and Karabakh militias supported by Armenia. On January 18th, 1992 the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh declared its independence. On May 12th, 1994 a ceasefire agreement was signed with the mediation from Russia.


1.2 International Missions in the Region

*The CSCE renamed itself OSCE at the Budapest Summit in Dec. 1994*

OSCE Mission in Georgia

The OSCE mission in Georgia was established in December 1992 to reach a peaceful political settlement to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and to help define the political status of the South-Ossetian region within Georgia. In Abkhazia the OSCE supports the UN in its efforts to maintain the territorial sovereignty of Georgia, while at the same time taking into account the interests of the Abkhazian population, a position that is expressed in the CSCE Declaration at the Budapest Summit of December 1994. Cooperation between the OSCE and the CIS peacekeeping forces deployed in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an issue that is addressed in Chapter III of the Helsinki Document of 1992. Click here for the OSCE Declaration on Georgia from November 1999. On December 15th, 1999 the mission was extended to monitor the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic.

 

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

UNOMIG was established on August 24th, 1993 by Security Council Resolution 858. Following the Abkhazian-Georgian Agreement signed in Moscow in May 1994, the mandate of UNOMIG was extended by Security Council Resolution 937 (1994), which included the monitoring and verification of the agreement's implementation by the involved parties, as well as providing for cooperation between UNOMIG and CIS peacekeeping forces. The mandate of UNOMIG has been repeatedly extended, most recently until January 31st, 2003 by Security Council Resolution 1427 (2002).
In December 2001 the Secretary-General's Special Representative D. Boden presented the document "Basic Principles
for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" to provide a basis for negotiations between the Abkhaz and Georgian leaders on the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia. Despite the support of the "Friends of Georgia", a group including the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and Bulgaria, objections are still being made by the Abkhaz side to use the paper as a basis for negotiations. 


OSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh

The CSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki decided in March 1992 to convene a conference in order to promote the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk Conference did not take place since Azerbaijan wanted the occupied territories to be returned first, but this initiative gave birth to the Minsk Group. The Minsk Group, now comprising Austria, Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the United States as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, aims for a political solution to the conflict and to let the Minsk Conference take place.
The December 1994 Budapest Summit expressed the will to set up a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force in the region. A high-level planning group (HLPG) was established in Vienna to examine the modalities of a deployment if the two conflicting parties reach an agreement. Additionally, a Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the conflict was appointed in August 1995 to assist in achieving this agreement. At the December 1996 Lisbon Summit the Chairman-in-Office defined in a statement, supported by all participating states except Armenia, the principles to be part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The OSCE has so far not managed to reach a consensus on a basis for negotiations between the parties.
 

1.3 Relations among the Southern Caucasus States and Cooperation in the Context of Regional Organisations

In the Southern Caucasus Armenia remains a close ally of Russia, whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan increasingly cooperate with NATO and other international organisations, distancing themselves from Russia.

Armenia wants to keep close relations with Russia to protect itself from potential threats coming from its neighbours Azerbaijan and Turkey. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are still problematic regarding the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Click here for a statement by Armenian President R. Kocharian on Nagorno Karabakh.
Georgia maintains good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, stressing the need for cooperation to improve the stability of the Caucasus. Georgia considers strengthening the relations with the European Union and the United States and its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures as a major objective of its foreign policy. From this cooperation, Georgia expects to eventually obtain security guarantees. Click here for references to the EU and the United States in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Azerbaijan follows the same foreign policy line as Georgia, trying to develop close relations with its neighbours Georgia and Turkey, for instance through the agreement on a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project which was signed in 1999. Azerbaijan evoked the possibility of membership in NATO and of accepting NATO military bases on its territory. In view of this, Russia is trying to improve its relations with Azerbaijan.

Regional organisations like GUUAM and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) were created as an alternative to the CIS, which is perceived to be dominated by Russian interests. Both organisations view the future security of the region as depending first upon economic and technical cooperation, as well as the development of infrastructure between the countries in order to facilitate the access to European and international markets. GUUAM countries, particularly Ukraine, are willing to reduce their dependence on energy and pipeline infrastructure from Russia and are therefore promoting a Eurasian Transportation Corridor for energy and goods.
For its part, the BSEC is trying to bring Russia to adopt a cooperative policy towards countries in the Black Sea region. The BSEC, which became an international economic regional organisation in April 1999, is developing communication networks and transport infrastructure between its members.


GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova)

GUAM, an organisation whose name is made up of the initials of its member states, was founded in 1997 by the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Its goal is to establish cooperation between these four states on political, economic and security issues, with the objective of strengthening their independence and sovereignty. During the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 Uzbekistan joined the organisation, resulting in the change of the organisation's name from GUAM to GUUAM. On this occasion GUUAM member states expressed their wish to cooperate closely with NATO within the framework of the EAPC and PfP Programmes in a joint statement. Click here for an older GUAM statement on cooperation with NATO (1997).
In the security field, cooperation among GUUAM states is based on a commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts based on a respect for territorial sovereignty. This position includes common peacekeeping activities, the fight against international terrorism and extremism and the adoption of Euro-Atlantic and European structures of security. GUUAM states also expressed their wish to cooperate in the security of transport corridors and pipelines. GUUAM expressed a critical view of the CIS peacekeeping mechanism's efficiency  in securing stability in the region in a joint statement at the special meeting of the OSCE security model committee in July 1998.
The New York Memorandum was signed by the Presidents of the GUUAM states on September 6th, 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit in order to institutionalise GUUAM consulting mechanisms. During the Yalta Summit in Ukraine in June 2001 GUUAM member states signed the Yalta Charter (in Russian). Following September 11th, a joint statement was issued with the United States on cooperation to fight terrorism. At the Yalta Summit of July 2002, an agreement establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) was signed by the four countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The ineffectiveness of GUUAM in implementing its decisions since its creation in 1997 was underlined with the decision of Uzbekistan to suspend its membership in the organization in June 2002.


The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

The BSEC, founded in 1992 by eleven states, is aimed primarily at increasing economic cooperation and development in the Black Sea region. Its membership comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. BSEC objectives are not restricted to the economic field, but consider economic cooperation to be a basis for the promotion of peace and security within the region. The Southern Caucasus states are also trying to increase their cooperation with the European Union through the BSEC. Click here for references to the BSEC in the Foreign Policy Concept of Georgia.
Click here for the Bosphorus Statement of June 25th, 1992 and the Istanbul Summit Declaration of November 18th, 1999.
The Agreement on the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was signed on April 2nd, 2001 in Istanbul by six member states of the BSEC: Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. BLACKSEAFOR will pool the naval forces of these countries in order to respond to emergency situations, its tasks including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine countermeasures and environmental protection. Click here for the statement by Georgian Minister of Defence D. Tevzadze on Blackseafor at the EAPC Meeting of Defence Ministers, June 8th, 2001. A document on confidence- and security-building measures in the Black Sea area was signed in Kiev on April 25th, 2002. In its Istanbul Decennial Summit Declaration of June 2002, the BSEC expressed its will to build stronger ties with the EU.


2. Russia and the Southern Caucasus

Russia tried to keep its historical control of the Caucasus region by integrating the former Soviet Republics into a security system in which it took the role of a "security manager". However, the CIS did not succeed at gaining credibility as a regional peacekeeping system, which gave some member states the incentive to explore other options for conflict settlement. Some of the CIS member states are opening up to the influence of Western organisations (primarily to NATO), and are furthermore seeking alliances with neighbouring states like Turkey as well as cooperating in subregional organisations like GUUAM.
In the aftermath of September 11th, the presence of U.S. military advisers in Georgia appears to be further reducing Russian influence in the region. At the US-Russian Summit of May 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President V. Putin recognized in a joint declaration the common interest of their countries in the stability and security of Central Asia and the Caucasus and affirmed cooperation in the resolution of regional conflicts.

2.1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed on December 8th, 1991 by the presidents of Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine. Later on the Almaty Declaration and Protocol to the Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was adopted on December 21st, 1991 by the eleven republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan as an observer. Azerbaijan joined the CIS on September 24th, 1993 and Georgia on December 9th, 1993.  

The CIS Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on May 15th, 1992  by six of its members: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus joined later.
However, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan decided in April 1999 not to renew the CIS Collective Security Treaty.  

Click here for an overview on membership of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty.


The activities of this group have concentrated on two issues: peacekeeping operations and the fight against terrorism.

    An Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS was signed during the Kiev Summit on March 20th, 1992 by all CIS members except Turkmenistan.

    A CIS Antiterrorist Center was established on December 1st, 2000 during the CIS Summit Meeting in Minsk. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine expressed reservations to the founding of this organisation, and refused to participate in all of its prescribed activities. On May 25th, 2001 the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty met in Yerevan and issued a joint statement in which they declared international terrorism and extremism to be a major challenge to the security of CIS countries.

References to the CIS in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2000


2.2 Relations with Southern Caucasus states

Russian-Georgian relations

Following its independence in April 1991, Georgia accused Russia of supporting the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia in order to destabilise the country's internal political situation. In Georgia's view, it was the aim of Russia to thereby strengthen its influence in the region. At the same time, Georgia is in a position to accept the military presence of the CIS peacekeeping forces within its territory in order to maintain the ceasefire in Abkhazia. This presence implies a degree of Russian political and military influence within Georgia.

The following issues are now determining the relations between Russia and Georgia:

The withdrawal by the Russian Federation of troops and military equipment from Georgia

In the context of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) undertaken during the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999, the Russian Federation agreed to withdraw part of its military equipment from Georgian territory in a joint statement with Georgia. Russia undertook to close the military bases of Gudauta and Vaziani by July 1st, 2001, while Georgia granted Russia the right to basic temporary deployment at the bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. But as of now, Russia is still procrastinating on the withdrawal from Gudauta. In the NATO Prague Summit Declaration adopted on November 21st, 2002, the Russian government was urged to fulfil the Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova.


Tension over border control

The presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge and of Georgian armed groups in the Kodori valley is a primary source of tension between Russia and Georgia. The Pankisi gorge, a region bordering Chechnya, became a home for Chechen refugees following the Chechen war. The Kodori valley is the only area in Abkhazia, which is still under the control of the Georgian government. The Russian government repeatedly accused the Georgian government of allowing Chechen fighters to use the Pankisi gorge as a safe haven and announced their intention to lead a counterterrorist operation in this area. The Georgian government, for its part, denounced the attempt made by the Russian government to interfere with its sovereignty. Following September 11th and in the context of the U.S. military aid to Georgia regarding counterterrorist activities, the mutual accusations are intensifying.

Two issues are raised by Russia in its criticism of Georgian policy

a) The presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge

In an official declaration regarding an incident on the Russian-Georgian border dating back to 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry urged the Georgian government to cooperate in operations against terrorist activities. Following September 11th, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement warning of the spread of international terrorism into Georgian territory. The Russian Foreign Ministry asked repeatedly for the extradition of Chechen rebels arrested by Georgian border guards while crossing the Russian-Georgian border, most recently in August 2002. The refusal by the Georgian government led the Russian government to question Georgia´s goodwill in participating in the fight against international terrorism.
On August 25th the Georgian government, under the leadership of Georgian law-enforcement agencies, launched a security operation in the Pankisi gorge. In an appeal to the UN Secretary General and to the UN Security Council and heads of OSCE countries on September 12th Russian President V. Putin criticized the Georgian security operation which failed to arrest the Chechen fighters and international terrorists who allegedly moved to other areas. He declared the intention of the Russian government to expand its anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya to the Georgian territory by citing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on anti-terrorism and the right of "self-defense" under the UN Charter. This appeal followed a statement by V. Putin in Sochi on September 11th, threatening to launch preemptive strikes against Chechen fighters in the Pankisi gorge, which provoked a prompt reaction from the Georgian side in a statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry. The Russian Duma declared in a statement on September 13th its support for a Russian military operation in the Pankisi gorge. Already on August 26th the Russian Foreign Ministry called in a statement for a joint Georgian-Russian counterterrorist operation in the area.
During a meeting in Chisinau on October 6th, Russian President V. Putin and Georgian President E. Shevarnadze agreed in a joint statement on joint military patrols of the Russian-Georgian border and on closer cooperation between their countries´ special services. On this occasion Georgian President E. Shevarnadze announced the extradition of the 13 Chechen suspects detained in Georgian custody since August 2002 to Moscow on terrorism charges. After the extradition of five detainees, the Georgian government suspended its decision to hand over the remaining eight suspects to the Russian authorities following an appeal from the European Court of Human Rights. The recent Moscow hostage crisis in October 2002 renewed the pressure of Russian authorities on Georgia to extradite the Chechen suspects still in custody. After having received guarantees from the Russian government regarding the future treatment of the prisoners, the European Court of Human Rights announced in a communique on November 26th that it no longer has any objection to the extradition of the Chechen suspects.
On December 7th, an anti-crime operation was conducted by Georgian law-enforcers in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi resulting in the arrests of 80 people and the extradition to Russia of one Chechen suspected of being involved in the Moscow apartment house bombings of 1999. The Georgian Ministry of State Security disclosed in January 2003 classified materials, including video tapes, in proof of the presence of Chechen and Arab fighters and their training camps in the Pankisi Gorge.
 
See EurasiaNet Pankisi Gorge Archive.


b) The support for armed groups in the Kodori valley

A series of incidents in the Kodori valley of Abkhazia, ranging from the shooting down of a UN helicopter and violation of Georgian airspace by Russian military jets in October and November 2001 to a quick deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops in April 2002, led to tensions between Russia and Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing the Georgian policy of tolerance towards terrorist groups. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted by accusing Russia of interfering with its sovereignty in a statement on October 10th, 2001 and a following statement on November 28th, 2001. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued another statement on September 3rd in reaction to the civil casualties resulting from a bombing raid by the Russian military aircraft on Georgian territory on August 23rd.
In the context of alleged support by the Georgian government to guerrilla groups, Russia accused Georgia of increasing  the instability in the Kodori valley as preparation for military operations in Abkhazia. In a statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry these accusations were rejected as groundless and mainly motivated by Russian concerns over Georgian-American military cooperation in counter-terrorist activities.

c) Special visa regime for breakaway regions

In December 2000, the Russian Federation granted a special visa arrangement to the Abkhazian and South-Ossetian regions, which undermined Georgia's control over transit across its borders.


Nagorno Karabakh

In January 2000 Russia expressed its readiness to act as a guarantor if a settlement to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict could be reached. In this way, Russia hoped to regain influence over Azerbaijan and to profile itself as a peacemaker in the region.


3. NATO and the Caucasus

3.1 Cooperation between the Southern Caucasus states and NATO

The signing of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document by Azerbaijan on May 4th, 1994, by Georgia on May 23rd, 1994 and by Armenia on October 5th, 1994 institutionalised the cooperation of the Southern Caucasus states with NATO. This strategy of cooperation had first been developed within the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Joint Council). The Southern Caucasus countries have recently begun to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR), Azerbaijan having troops within the Turkish Battalion. Click here for references to NATO international peacekeeping forces in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Click here for the statements by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Azerbaijan on NATO's role in the Caucasus at the meeting of the EAPC on December 15th, 2000 and references to NATO in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On September 13th, 2002 the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the Georgian government to take the necessary steps to start the accession process to NATO. On October 1st, a memorandum of understanding on logistic cooperation was signed between Georgia and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO), opening the way for the implementation of a PfP Trust Fund Project for the demilitarization and disposal of missile stockpiles and the remediation of Georgian military sites. Georgia and Azerbaijan officially applied for joining NATO at the NATO Prague Summit of November 21st-22nd, 2002 as declared in a statement by Georgian President E. Shevarnadze and a statement by the President of Azerbaijan H. Aliyev.

3.2 U.S. Interests in the Caucasus

In the Caucasus - and generally in the Caspian area - the objective of the U.S. until recently was primarily to maintain access to the region, particularly to its oil and gas resources, while at the same time avoiding involvement in regional conflicts or direct confrontation with other major powers. The United States is mainly interested in assuring the security conditions that are necessary for oil production and export.
However, this policy of neutrality is likely to change with the sending of U.S. military advisers to Georgia in April 2002.

U.S. involvement in the Caucasus

Following September 11th the United States increased its involvement in the Caucasus. Click here for a statement on U.S. Policy in the Caucasus by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, E. Jones, from March 13th, 2002.

The U.S. policy in the Caucasus focuses on two issues:

    Counterterrorism: With the Georgian Train-and-Equip Program, which was launched on April 29th, 2002, the United States offered military assistance in counter-terrorism to Georgia in response to the growing instability of the Pankisi Valley, a region bordering Chechnya on Georgian territory. At the U.S.-Russian Summit of May 2002 the United States affirmed its commitment to work along with Russia on the elimination of terrorism in Georgia in a joint statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on counterterrorism cooperation. In a statement on September 14th, U.S. President G. W. Bush affirmed its full support for the Georgian government security operation in the Pankisi gorge and appealed to Russian President V. Putin to allow the Georgian government to fulfill this task. On September 26th the U.S. Mission to the OSCE outlined in a statement the opposition of the United States to any unilateral Russian military action inside Georgian territory. Click here for a description of terrorist activities in Georgia in the report Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001-Eurasia Overview issued by the U.S. Department of State on May 24th, 2002. See the testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs L. Pascoe from September 24th, 2002 for an overview of Georgia´s strategic importance for the United States.

    Resolution of regional conflicts: The United States stressed the need for a political settlement of the conflicts in the region and affirmed its readiness to cooperate with Russia on this issue in a joint declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin at the U.S.-Russian Summit of May 2002.


Pipeline projects

The transport of Caspian energy resources to international markets is an issue that involves the interests of all major powers acting in the region: Russia, the United States, Turkey, Iran and China. The aim of U.S. involvement in oil production and export in the Caspian Region is to reduce the its future dependence on oil resources in the Persian Gulf. The two major oil exporting countries in the Caspian region are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In 1994 the Azeri State Oil Company (SOCAR) signed the "Contract of the Century" with an international consortium of foreign oil companies.
Under the Clinton Administration, a Caspian energy diplomacy effort was initiated as described in a statement by the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin energy diplomacy, J. Wolf, from October 4th, 2000. A general description of the U.S. interests in the Caspian region can be found in a statement by Under Secretary S. Eizenstat on Caspian energy development from October 23rd, 1997. The Clinton Administration followed a "Caspian strategy", which consisted in the promotion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline through Turkey. An alternative to this plan would be the Baku-Supsa route on the Georgian Black Sea coast. For its part, Russia is seeking to promote the use of the existing oil pipeline which runs through Grozny between Baku and Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast. This option has the advantage of being cheaper than the construction of a new pipeline through Georgia, but both the United States and the countries in the region are trying to avoid a Russian monopoly. Also, due to the volatile political situation there, the route through Chechnya is not secure; the pipelines have been subject to numerous terrorist attacks during the Chechen crisis. The security of pipelines is of concern to all of the countries involved, as pipelines can become the target for terrorist activities. Click here for references to pipeline security in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In September 2001, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. This agreement was welcomed in a statement by the U.S. Department of State.
There seems to be a general preference for the existence of  multiple pipelines because this would allow the Caspian states to escape foreign influence and to facilitate their global economic integration. In a joint statement of U.S. President G.W. Bush and Russian President V. Putin at the U.S.-Russia summit of May 2002, a New Energy Dialogue between the United States and Russia was announced, centering on cooperation in their energy sectors by promoting joint projects. On November 22nd, a joint statement was made in St. Petersburg on the first results in the development of the U.S.-Russian Energy Dialogue.
 
Map of existing and proposed pipelines in the Caspian region


 Two main projects are emerging from the different options:

    The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Project: During the OSCE Istanbul Summit on November 17th, 1999 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan framework agreements were signed. This route would make it possible to link Georgia and Azerbaijan with NATO ally Turkey and, consequently, with the West. Despite objections based on its commercial viability, the construction of the pipeline will begin soon. An official ceremony was held in Baku in September 2002 to mark the start of its construction. The U.S. Department of State welcomed the official approval of the Georgian government of the BTC oil pipeline in a press statement. The Bush Administration is now actively supporting the development of a Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route, which would allow the inclusion of Kazakhstan in the BTC project.

    The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Project: The CPC Project involves the governments of Kazakhstan, Russia and Oman as well as American oil companies (Chevron and ExxonMobil). The CPC Project was officially launched in November 2001 and welcomed in a statement by U.S. President G.W. Bush as a means to enhance U.S. energy security. The CPC pipeline links the Tengiz oil field in western Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Anapa on the Black Sea Coast.


Support for NIS sovereignty

Until recently U.S. policy was to help the Newly Independent States (NIS) to assert their independence and sovereignty and to escape the influence of Russia, as expressed in a statement by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser for the NIS States S. Sestanovich on U.S. Policy Toward Russia from July 16th, 1998. The U.S. Department of State criticized the Russian Federation's threat to the territorial sovereignty of Georgia following the war in Chechnya. Click here for a selection of Press statements by the U.S. Department of State on the following topics:

    Russian Bombing of Georgia, August 24th, 2002
    Helicopters entering Georgian air space from Russian territory, November 28th, 2001
    Russian Imposition of Visa Regime for Georgia, December 5th, 2000
    OSCE Monitoring of Russian-Georgian Border, February 23rd, 2000


4. Cooperation with the European Union and the Council of Europe

Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe in April 1999. Accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been voted respectively on January 17th and January 25th, 2001.

The European Union (EU) signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia during the visit of the three Caucasian presidents in Luxembourg in April 1996, which entered into force on July 1st, 1999. The EU is active in the Caucasus along two different lines:

    Cooperation with the OSCE: The EU cooperates with the OSCE in the Caucasus by promoting confidence-building and through the implementation of special actions in conflict areas. The European Union supplied equipment to the Georgian Border Guard on the Chechen border in order to support OSCE monitoring operations and signed an assistance agreement with the OSCE in December 2001. The EU Presidency issued two declarations respectively on August 12th and August 28th on the violations of the Georgian airspace by military aircraft. The EU expressed its concern over the exacerbation of tension between Russia and Georgia and declared its support to the Georgian government in its efforts to restore order in the Pankisi valley.

    The TRACECA Programme: The EU is supporting the project of a transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia through the Caucasus.


Speeches

    Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: Statement at the EAPC Summit Meeting, Prague, 22 November 2002
    Minister of Defence of Georgia D. Tevzadze: EAPCs Role in the International Fight Against Terrorism, Meeting of the EAPC in Defence Ministers session, Brussels, 7 June 2002
    Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia I. Menagarishvili: Statement at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Rekyavik, 15 May 2002
    Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.Menagarishvili: Speech at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, 7 December 2001
    Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: Address to the Conference "Georgia and its Partners: Directions for the New Millennium", Tbilisi, 5 October 2000
    Secretary General of NATO G. Robertson at the Conference "Caucasus today: Perspectives of Regional Cooperation and Partnership with the NATO", Tbilisi, 26 September 2000


Research Studies

1. Georgia

    Larsson, R.L.: Georgia´s Missing Security Compass, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 July 2003  
    Darchiashvili, D.: Dilemmas for the Future of Georgia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 May 2003
    Devdariani, J.: Georgia on a Fault Line, Perspective, Vol. XIII/No. 3, January-February 2003
    Anjaparidze, Z.: Will Georgia cut the Pankisi knot?, The Jamestown Foundation Russian and Eurasian Review, Vol. 1/Issue 12, 19 November 2002
    Baran, Z.: Despite ongoing Russian Pressure, Time for Real Change in Georgia, CSIS - Georgia Update, 4 November 2002
    Di Puppo, L.: Die Pankisi Schlucht und die russisch-georgischen Beziehungen, antimilitarismus information 11/02, November 2002 (German only)
    Blank, S.: The Russian Bourbons: Civil-Military Relations and Pressure on Georgia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
    Blum, D.: The Russian-Georgian Crisis and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, CSIS Russia/Eurasia Program, PONARS Policy Memo No 252, October 2002
    Baev, P.: Russia´s Virtual War against Georgia: Risks of a PR Offensive, CSIS Russia/Eurasia Program, PONARS Policy Memo No 251, October 2002
    Devdariani, J.: Georgia Reacts to Russian Pressure, Perspective, Vol. XIII/No. 1, September-October 2002
    Hancilova, B.: Russia´s Grab for Pankisi: Domestic Diversion or Oil Politics?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 September 2002
    Bayran, Z.: Georgian-Russian Tension on the Rise, CSIS - Georgia Update, 21 August 2002
    Devdariani, J./ Hancilova, B.: Georgia´s Pankisi Gorge - Russian, U.S. and European Connections, Center for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No 23, June 2002
    Baev, P.: Georgia's Pankisi Gorge and the Global War against Terrorism, Summary of Event, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, 12 April 2002
    Baran, Z.: Tension Increasing in Abkhazia - Georgia Restates Commitment to Non-Military Solution, CSIS - Georgia Update, 1 April 2002
    Schmidt, Jürgen: Krieg gegen den Terrorismus im Südkaukasus ? Die USA entsenden Militärberater nach Georgien, SWP-Brennpunkte, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 22 March 2002 (German only)
    Baran, Z.: United States Will Help Georgia Fight Terrorism and Strengthen Internally, CSIS - Georgia Update, 4 March 2002
    Blandy, C.W.: Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees & Fighters, Conflict Studies Research Center, March 2002
    Kurtsikidze, S. / Chikovani, V.: Georgia´s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Spring 2002
    Areshidze, I.G.: Helping Georgia ?,Perspective, Vol. XII/No. 4, February-March 2002
    Blank, Stephen: The Prospects of Russian-American Partnership: The Georgian Litmus Test, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 30 January 2002
    Pataraia, T.: Impact of the Conflict in Chechnya on Georgian Security System, Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy and Development, 14 March 2001
    Feinberg, J.: The Armed Forces in Georgia, CDI Monograph, Center for Defense Information, March 1999

2. Regional conflicts

    Martirosyan, T.: Nagorno-Karabakh: Toward Stalemate or Settlement ?, The Jamestown Foundation, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol 2, Issue 1, 7 January 2003
    Ismailzade, F: Latest Efforts to Solve Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute Fails, Killing Talk of Economic Cooperation, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
    Martirosyan, T.: Land Swap in Nagorno-Karabakh: Much Noise over an Unrealistic Option, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 14 August 2002
    Ismailzade, F.: The OSCE Minsk Group: Is There Space for Improvement ?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 June 2002
    Shahnazarian, D.: Prospects for the Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh Problem, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 5 June 2002
    Baev, P./Koehler, J./Zuercher, C.: Civil Wars in the Caucasus, World Bank Development Economics Research Group (DECRG)/Yale University, UN Studies Program, 15 March 2002
    Cvetovski, N.: The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, Dissertation Aalborg University, 13 March 2002
    Sabanadze, N: International Involvement in the South Caucasus, European Center for Minority Issues, ECMI Working Paper # 15, February 2002
    Amirbayov, E.: Shusha's Pivotal Role in a Nagorno-Karabagh Settlement, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 6, December 2001
    Darchiashvili, D.: Some considerations about ways to solve the conflict in Abkhazia, Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy and Development, 14 March 2001
    Tavitian, N.: An irrestible force meets an immovable object: The Minsk Group negotiations on the status of Nagorno Karabakh, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Case Studies in International Diplomacy, Case 1/00, 2000
    Cohen, J. (ed): A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process, Accord 7, Conciliation Resources, September 1999 (Russian version)
    Coppieters, B. / Darchiashvili, D. / Akaba, N. (eds): Federal Practice - Exploring alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia, Vrije Universiteit Brussel University Press, 1999
    Carley, P.: Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 25, December 1998
    Coppieters, B. / Nodia, G. / Anchabadze, Y. (eds): Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, Caucasian Regional Studies Vol. 3, No 2 & 3, August 1998
    Derluguian, G.M.: The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since and the Soviet Collapse, in: Crawford, B. / Lipschutz, R.D. (ed.): The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence, University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #98, 1998
    Manutscharjan, A.: Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven, ZEI Discussion Paper C 18, Center for European Integration Studies, 1998 (German only)
    Hansen, G.: Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners, Occasional Paper No 32, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1998
    Nodia, G.: Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Winter 1997-1998
    MacFarlane, N. / Minear, L. / Shenfield, S.: Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, Occasional Paper No 21, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996
    MacFarlane, N. / Minear, L: Humanitarian Action and Politics: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Occasional Paper No 25, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996

3. Southern Caucasus

    Huseyinov, T.: Towards Crafting a National Security Doctrine in Azerbaijan, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 26 March 2003
    Ismailova, G.: Will Azerbaijan Join The War on Iraq?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 29 January 2003
    Cohen, A.: Regional Security Implications of the Moscow Hostage-Taking, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 20 November 2002
    Devdariani, J./ Hancilova, B.: U.S. Involvement in Caucasian Security Architecture Grows, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 23 October 2002
    "South Caucasus and the Caspian: A View from Baku", Adress by I. Aliyev, Summary of Event, BSCIA Caspian Studies Program, 22 October 2002
    Linotte, D./ Aune, L.: The GUUAM Free Trade Agreement: A Concrete Step Forward, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 September 2002
    Blank, S.: The Future of Transcaspian Security, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Regional Studies, August 2002
    Valiyev, A.: Azerbaijani-Turkmen Relations: Quarreling Brothers, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 31 July 2002
    Sherr, J.: Democracy in the Black Sea Region: The Missing Link in Regional Security, Conflict Studies Research Center, July 2002
    Blank, S.: U.S. Military in Azerbaijan To Counter Iranian Threat, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 10 April 2002
    Ulusoy, H.: A New Formation in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR, Perceptions, Vol VI / No 4, December 2001- February 2002
    Ferrari, M.-P.: Les Républiques du Caucase entre passé soviétique et mondialisation, Mémoire, Institut Européen des Hautes Études Internationales Nices, 2002 (French only)
    Black Sea Basin regional profile: The security situation and the region-building evolution of South-Eastern Europe, Institute for Security and International Studies, Research Study 13, January-March 2002
    Shaffer, B.: U.S. Policy toward the Caspian Region: Recommendations for the Bush Administration, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2001
    Baev, P.: Russia Refocuses its Policies in the Southern Caucasus, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2001
    U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian Region (Conference Report), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, 11 July 2001
    Fairbanks, C. / Nelson, R. / Starr, F. / Weisbrode, K.: Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States / Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, January 2001
    Valášek, T.: Military Cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova in the GUUAM Framework, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 2, December 2000
    Smith, M.: Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad, Conflict Studies Research Center, December 2000
    Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics, Conference Report, National Intelligence Council, October 2000
    Blank, S.: U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2000
    Herd, G. / Moustakis, F.: Black Sea Geopolitics: Dilemmas, Obstacles & Prospects, Conflict Studies Research Center, June 2000
    A Stability Pact for the Caucasus, Center for European Policy Studies, Working Document No.145, May 2000
    New Political Aspects of GUUAM development, Monitoring - Foreign & Security Policy of Ukraine, Occasional Paper 48/00, 2000
    Oliker, O.: Ukraine and the Caspian - An Opportunity for the United States, RAND - Center for Russia and Eurasia, 2000
    Lanskoy, M.: Anti-Terrorism as Pretext: Russia taking Aim at the South Caucasus?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 2000
    Thomas, T.: Russian National Interests and the Caspian Sea, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1999-2000
    Alieva, L.: Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in post-Soviet South Caucasus, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Winter 1999-2000
    Sokolsky, R. / Charlick-Paley, T.: NATO and Caspian security: A Mission Too Far?, RAND - Center for Russia and Eurasia, 1999
    Blank, S.: NATO after Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 1998
    Garnett, S.W.: Russia and its Borderlands: A Geography of Violence, U.S. Army War College, Parameters, Spring 1997
    Hopmann, T./Shenfield, S./Arel, D.: Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Regional and Global Security, Occasional Paper No 30, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1997

4. Caspian Pipelines

    Tsereteli, M.: Russia Close to Regaining Control over Strategic Georgian Assets, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 11 September 2002
    Aliriza, B. / Ciftci, S.: Turkey´s Caspian Energy Quandry, CSIS - Caspian Energy Update, 13 August 2002
    Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey Pipelines project - Georgian Section, International Fact Finding Mission Preliminary Report, CEE Bankwatch Network, 31 July 2002
    Allison, G. / Grennan, J.: U.S. Policy on Russian and Caspian Oil Exports: Addressing America's Oil Addiction, Discussion Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2002
    Spector, R.: The North-South Transport Corridor, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 3 July 2002
    Müller, F.: Entwicklungspotentiale und Wirtschaftsinteressen, Jour Fixe Zentralasien / Kaukasus, SWP-Brennpunkte, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 16 June 2002 (German only)
    Kiesling, L. / Becker, J.: Russia's Role in the Shifting World Oil Market, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 8, May 2002
    Kochladze, M.: Pocketing Caspian Black Gold: Who are the Real Beneficiaries of Oil Infrastructure Development in Georgia and Azerbaijan?, Transnational Institute / CEE Bankwatch Network, April 2002
    Udum, S.: The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Ressources: A Challenge for Turkish Foreign Policy, Perceptions, Vol VI / No 4, December 2001- February 2002
    Cutler, R.: The Caspian Pipeline Consortium Beats the Skeptics, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 12 September 2001
    McKeeby, D.: "Crude Business": Corruption and Caspian Oil, CSIS - Caspian Energy Update, 1 September 2001
    Pamir, N.: Turkey: The Key to Caspian Oil and Gas, IASPS Strategic Research Papers, September 2001
    Allison, G. / Van Buskirk, E.: Mini-Case and Illustrative Paradigm, U.S. Policy on Caspian Energy Development and Exports, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, May 2001
    Walters, J.: Caspian Oil and Gas: Mitigating Political Risks for Private Participation, World Bank Group, June 2000
    Cordersman, A.H.:  The US Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia and Iran, CSIS, 27 April 2000
    Rubin, Vadim: The Geopolitics of Energy Development in the Caspian Region: Regional Cooperation or Conflict ?, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), December 1999
    Rosenthal, S.: NATO, Russia, and Oil pipelines, Stratfor, 15 June 1999
    Joseph, J.: Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration's Fight for Baku-Ceyhan, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Case Studies in International Diplomacy, Case 1/99, 1999
    Cohen, A.: The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1065, 25 January 1996
    Raptis, K.: Nagorno Karabakh and the Eurasian Transport Corridor, Occasional Paper, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), March 1998
    Oil and Gas Resources of the Fergana Basin (Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, December 1994

CSCE-Budapest Summit 1994
Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era
The Budapest Document, 5-6 December 1994

Faced with the alarming situation in the Republic of Georgia, which has been even further aggravated by the recent events in Abkhazia, the participating States reiterated their strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. On the basis of these principles, a settlement of the conflicts in Georgia must be reached. The interests of the multi-ethnic population in the areas of conflicts must also be taken into account.

National Security Concept of Georgia

“It is the strong will of the citizens of Georgia to establish democratic order, economic freedom, a social state governed by the rule of law, to ensure universal human rights and freedoms and to strengthen state independence and peaceful co-existence with other nations…”

Preamble to the Constitution of Georgia

Introduction

Georgia is publishing its National Security Concept for the second time. The document reflects the changes that have taken place in the security environment of Georgia, as well as their influence on the threats and challenges to national security.

The National Security Concept of Georgia is the basic document that explains fundamental national values and national interests, the vision of the nation’s secure development, threats, risks and challenges, and establishes the main directions for national security policy.

The Government of Georgia develops, and the Parliament of Georgia ratifies, the National Security Concept. Political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and other representatives of civil society have played an important role in the drafting of the Concept. Based on the National Security Concept, the Government of Georgia implements measures to ensure the protection of fundamental national values and the advancement of national interests, and to respond adequately to the risks, threats, and challenges facing the country.

The National Security Concept creates the basis for the development of specific strategies and plans that are updated along with changes to the National Security Concept.

Security Environment of Georgia

International and regional developments of the last few years have significantly changed the security environment of Georgia.

The large-scale military aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Georgia in August 2008 made it clear that, for certain countries, open military aggression is still a tool they are willing to employ in order to accomplish their political goals in today’s world.

The military aggression by the Russian Federation in 2008, the occupation of Georgian territories, and the deployment of occupation forces in Georgian territories significantly worsened Georgia’s security environment. The 2008 war demonstrated that the Russian Federation does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia, including Georgia’s choice of democracy and its independent domestic and foreign policy.

Moreover, the military aggression by the Russian Federation worsened the security environment in the Caucasus region as a whole. In addition, the instability in the North Caucasus and the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh both negatively impact Georgia’s security environment. The creation of a peaceful and cooperative environment in the Caucasus region would pay positive dividends for the security of Georgia.

Broadening the integration processes in Europe is important for the security of Georgia. Georgia is a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore, the expansion eastward of NATO and of the European Union is important for Georgia.

Georgia maintains close relations with the world’s leading democratic states. The support of these countries plays an important role in the development of a democratic Georgia.

Along with a constantly changing international environment, other factors - such as domestic political processes - also influence the security of Georgia. Strengthening the country’s democratic achievements by continuing reforms positively impacts stability and furthers the development of the state’s democratic institutions.

For the stable and secure development of the country, it is critically important to maintain high long-term economic growth; this is achieved through the adoption of the free-market principles in the economy, strict fiscal discipline, and a healthy monetary policy. Open partnerships, free trade, and economic relationships with all nations and international entities - especially the European Union, the United States and the countries in the region - are important choices that Georgia has made.

National Values of Georgia Sovereignty and territorial integrity

Georgia is an independent, united, and indivisible state within the borders defined by the Constitution of Georgia. It respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and expects the same from them. Georgia will not accept any attempts to infringe upon its sovereignty, including attempts to change forcibly its foreign policy and to interfere in its internal affairs.

Freedom

The rights and freedoms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are recognized by Georgia and guaranteed by its Constitution. Georgia guarantees the rights and freedoms of all citizens and groups residing in Georgia, respects their right of free choice, guarantees the right to freedom of speech, thought, conscience, religion, and belief, and creates a favorable environment that enables each citizen to realize his or her potential. Georgia recognizes that economic freedom is a precondition for the realization of all other rights and freedoms.

Democracy and rule of law

Georgia adheres to democratic values and principles, and, based on these, establishes a system of democratic governance in which state power is limited by law and distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Georgia ensures the rule of law, pluralism, and the protection of the rights of minorities, and seeks to strengthen civil society and other democratic institutions.

Security

Georgia strives to ensure the security of the state, its citizens, and institutions within its internationally recognized borders. In order to ensure its security, Georgia adheres to the norms and principles of international law and believes that security is indivisible, both in the relationships among citizens in the country and within the international system, since one state’s security cannot be strengthened at the expense of another state.

Prosperity

Georgia recognizes that the pursuit of prosperity is a fundamental human right to guarantee, one that is only possible in a free environment. To achieve maximum welfare for its citizens, Georgia strives for the sustainable development of the state by creating a free economic environment characterized by small government, responsible macroeconomic policy, low taxes, and focused social policy.

Peace

Georgia strives to establish relationships with all nations based on the norms and principles of international law. In order to resolve disputes, Georgia appeals to peaceful and internationally accepted methods. A free, independent, united, developed, and peaceful Georgia will strengthen regional and international security and stability.

National Interests of Georgia

1. Ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity: Georgia is determined to use all available lawful and peaceful means to restore and maintain its territorial integrity and protect its internationally recognized borders.

2. Developing state institutions and strengthening democracy: Georgia is creating a model of governance that provides for the further and sustainable development of the country’s democratic political system. Georgia’s aim is to strengthen democratic institutions that will provide for the rule of law, the safeguarding of human rights and liberties, and the protection of freedom of speech, thought, conscience, religion, and belief. It is important to establish democratic values in society, to increase civic consciousness, and to further strengthen trust in state institutions.

3. Development of an efficient national security system: Georgia aims to create a security system that guarantees the further development of Georgian statehood and the security of its citizens.

4. Strengthening national unity and civil consent: Georgia guarantees the protection of the interests of its citizens, their rights and freedoms. Hence, Georgia facilitates the creation of a society governed by equality before the law, pluralism, tolerance, justice, human rights, and equality—regardless of race, language, gender, religion, political or other affiliations. The equal engagement of members of the multiethnic and multi-confessional Georgian nation in public and political life is one of the priorities of the state. It is important to have contact with citizens of Georgia living in the occupied territories and to integrate them into the political, economic, social, and cultural processes of the country.

5. European and Euro-Atlantic integration: Georgia aspires to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which will enable it to consolidate its democracy and strengthen its national security. Georgia is committed to the principle that all nations have the right to choose their own strategic path for future development, as well as the alliances they want to join.

6. Securing stable long-term economic growth: Creating an environment for stable and high long-term economic growth is one of the top priorities of Georgian national security policy. The Government of Georgia ensures free economic development, the broadening of the country’s international economic relationships, the improvement of the investment environment in order to attract foreign capital, the maintenance of the principles of small government, a conservative fiscal policy, and a healthy monetary policy.

7. Ensuring energy security: In order to ensure the country’s energy security, the further diversification of energy sources and transportation routes is a priority for Georgia. It is equally important to support the development and modernization of the country’s energy systems, as well as their integration into regional energy infrastructure. The further strengthening of Georgia’s energy capacity will positively affect state security, economic development, and the welfare of citizens.

8. Ensuring regional stability: Developments in Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus directly affect Georgia’s national security. Developments in Central Asia and the Middle East also play an important role for Georgia. The maintenance of stability and security and the peaceful resolution of the existing disagreements in these regions is in Georgia’s interest. Georgia contributes to regional security through cooperation in multilateral and bilateral international frameworks.

9. Strengthening the transit role of Georgia: Georgia considers strengthening its transit role to be particularly important. Therefore, Georgia is prepared to participate even more actively in international energy, transport, and communications projects.

10. Ensuring the environmental security of Georgia and the region: Environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources is closely related to public health and safety. Ensuring environmental security is especially important while implementing large-scale domestic and international projects.

11. Ensuring civil integration and maintaining national and cultural uniqueness: Georgia’s priority is to maintain and develop its cultural diversity and national uniqueness. It is important for Georgia to foster the integration and engagement of all ethnic groups in the country’s development process. Georgia creates conditions for the protection and development of the identity and culture of these groups.

12. Strengthening cyber security: The security of cyber space and the protection of electronic information is very important for Georgia. As information technologies rapidly evolve, critical infrastructure is becoming more dependent on them. Therefore, combating cyber crime and protecting against cyber attacks is very important to the national interests of Georgia.

13. Demographic security: Promoting a healthy lifestyle, striving to achieve higher life expectancy, encouraging the repatriation of Georgian citizens and compatriots and their subsequent reintegration, all are important priorities for the Government of Georgia. Demographic security is directly linked to Georgia’s stable and high long-term economic growth.

14. Relations with the diaspora: It is important for Georgia to strengthen ties with compatriots living abroad, to support the study of the Georgian language, and to preserve the cultural identity of Georgians of the diaspora.

Threats, Risks and Challenges to the National Security of Georgia

1. Occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation and terrorist acts organized by the Russian Federation from the occupied territories

At the beginning of the 20th century, Georgia was the victim of Russian aggression that led to 70 years of Soviet occupation. In 1991, Georgia regained its independence; this was followed by political and economic instability caused by the Russian Federation. At the beginning of the 1990s, aggressive separatist movements—fueled and supported by the Russian Federation—triggered an armed confrontation in which military forces of the Russian Federation directly participated, together with local criminal groups. This confrontation resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Georgians, a fact recognized by the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe, and the European Parliament.

In order to infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and to limit its free and democratic choice, in August 2008 the Russian Federation perpetrated a further military aggression, accompanied by a new wave of ethnic cleansing. The unlawful actions of the Russian Federation are documented in the Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, commissioned by the European Union. The occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation is recognized by a number of governments, as well as by international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In an attempt to legalize the results of its military aggression, the Russian government, ignoring the principles of international law and the Ceasefire Agreement signed by the Russian Federation and Georgia on August 12, 2008, declared the occupied regions to be independent states and deployed new military forces and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. In addition, the Russian Federation appealed to other members of the international community to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, placing political and economic pressure on certain countries to do so.

The military occupation of part of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation breaches the sovereignty of Georgia and is a factor that impedes its statehood and subverts its political, economic, and social development. The intensive militarization of the occupied regions and the deployment of Russian ground, air, naval, and border forces breaches Georgia’s sovereignty and endangers security in the region as a whole.

Russia’s disrespect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states—and its attempts to change the European and Euro-Atlantic security architecture and restore principle of “spheres of influence”—endanger not only Georgia, but also all states that are neighbors of the Russian Federation as well as European security in general.

There is ample evidence that, after the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 and the occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, Russia has used these territories to recruit and train terrorists to carry out terrorist acts in other parts of Georgian territory, as evidenced by the recent identification of terrorist groups and the subsequent suppression of their activity.

Regular and severe human rights violations by the proxy regimes and the Russian occupation forces in the occupied regions are alarming. Georgian citizens living in the occupied territories are systematically persecuted because of their ethnicity, while attempts to artificially change the demographic balance continue. Georgia is concerned about the threat that the occupation creates for the ethnic and cultural identity of the Abkhaz.

The illegal economic activity of the Russian Federation and the exploitation of the natural resources in the occupied territories result in critical environmental damage to these regions of Georgia.

2. The risk of renewed military aggression from Russia

Russia’s military aggression in August 2008 not only aimed at the occupation of Georgian territories and the international recognition of the proxy regimes, but also sought to trigger a change on Georgia’s foreign policy and the violent overthrow of its democratically elected government. The ruling political elite of the Russian Federation view an independent and democratic Georgia as an important threat. Therefore, the Russian Federation aims to turn Georgia into a failed state, to hinder the realization of Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic choice, and to forcibly return Georgia to the Russian political orbit. The presence of Russian military forces in the occupied Georgian territories, and the construction and strengthening of military bases there, create a staging-ground for provocations and a bridgehead for a possible renewed military aggression. The Russian Federation is in breach of the fundamental norms of international law, fails to fulfill the Russian-Georgian Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008, and refuses to pledge not to attack Georgia. It blocks the work of the UN and OSCE missions in Georgia, resists the implementation of the European Union Monitoring Mission’s mandate in the occupied territories, and opposes the idea of creating an international peacekeeping/police mechanism. Considering all this, there is a risk of renewed Russian aggression. However, international support for Georgia, as well as the presence of the European Union Monitoring Mission on the ground, are important deterrents to possible aggression.

3. Violation of the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees from the occupied territories

The ethnic cleansing in the early 1990s and in 2008 resulted in the expulsion of approximately 80% of the residents of these territories from their homes—a total of approximately 500,000 individuals, about 261,000 of whom presently reside in the unoccupied part of Georgia.

The violation of the fundamental rights of the individuals forcibly evicted from the occupied territories is a serious challenge for Georgia. It is an important priority for Georgia to protect the rights of these people, including their right to live and own property in the occupied territories.

4. Conflicts in the Caucasus

The possible spillover of conflicts from neighboring countries is a threat to Georgia.

The conflicts in the Caucasus negatively affect the security of the whole region and represent potential sources of humanitarian crises. At the same time, the Russian Federation is attempting to demonize Georgia among the population of the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.

The lack of control over the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, which border the Russian Federation, breeds conditions favorable to transnational criminals and further impedes the effective fight against transnational crime.

Another challenge is the continuing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The renewal of military confrontation between these two states would weaken the security of all three South Caucasian nations and increase Russia’s political influence over the entire region.

5. International terrorism and transnational organized crime

Terrorism is a serious challenge to the modern world ; it emanates from certain states and non-state actors.

The occupied regions of Georgia offer favorable conditions for transnational organized crime and international terrorism. State-organized terrorist acts present a particular threat to Georgia.

Considering Georgia’s important transit role and potential, there is a danger that the occupied territories could be used for illegal activities such as trafficking and trade in arms, components of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, and human beings.

6. Economic and social challenges

The low rate of long-term economic growth is a challenge to Georgia’s national security. It is important to be prepared to cope with the challenges generated by a renewed world economic crisis. Further improvement of the economic growth rate is important for the security of Georgia. Insufficient economic growth could lead to a severe reduction in state revenues and a drastic rise in unemployment that could breed social tension, thus threatening the country’s development, its stability, and its national security. For the long-term economic security of Georgia, it is important to maintain and further increase the competitiveness of Georgia’s economy and citizens.

7. Energy challenges

Strengthening energy independence is important for the national security of Georgia. For this purpose, it is crucial to diversify sources of energy.

The further development of clean energy sources and the creation of required infrastructure is also important to the energy security of Georgia.

8. Cyber threats

As dependency of Georgia’s critical infrastructure on information technologies increases, challenges related to the protection of Georgian cyberspace are growing. During the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the Russian Federation conducted large-scale cyber-attacks, in parallel with the ground, air, and naval attacks,. These attacks showed that the protection of cyberspace is as important for national security as land, maritime, and air defenses.

9. Environmental challenges

Natural processes and man-made crises might threaten Georgia’s natural environment, its bio-diversity, and the well-being of its citizens.

Georgia is concerned with the environmental damage caused by the Russian Federation’s occupation of Georgian territories—particularly in Abkhazia, in connection with the preparations for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. The Government of Georgia, in cooperation with the international community, will take measures to prevent the illegal extraction of construction materials and timber, and their subsequent transportation to Russia, which might cause an environmental disaster on the Black Sea shore.

10. Demographic challenges

Improving the demographic situation is important for the country’s development. It is noteworthy that, compared to earlier years, both the birth rate and the return of emigrants to Georgia have accelerated. Maintaining this positive dynamic is a challenge for Georgia.

The attempts by the Russian Federation to change, artificially and illegally, the demographic balance in the occupied territories by settling Russian citizens there under favorable conditions pose an important challenge for Georgia. Moreover, such policies pose dangers to Abkhaz identity as well.

11. Challenges to civic integration

Civic integration requires the establishment of conditions in which all Georgian citizens of Georgia can learn the national language, thus facilitating their full participation in the nation’s political, economic, social, and cultural life.

12. Destruction or damage of cultural heritage monuments

The protection of the monuments inked to the country’s cultural heritage is important for Georgia. Georgia is concerned about intentional damage to cultural heritage monuments in the occupied territories. Another important issue is the protection of monuments linked to the country’s cultural heritage that are located outside of Georgia.

Priorities of National Security Policy

1.Ending the occupation of Georgia’s territories; relations with the Russian Federation.

1.1. Ending the occupation: Ending the occupation of Georgia’s territories, the reintegration of people living in these territories, and the restoration of Georgian sovereignty on the whole territory of the country are the most important priorities of the country’s national security policy.

The Government of Georgia is determined to take timely and effective steps toward the de-occupation of Georgian territories through peaceful means, based on the principles of international law. Georgia remains committed to the non-use of force obligations undertaken under the Russian-Georgian Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008.

At the same time, Georgia has undertaken a unilateral commitment on non-use of force, as declared by the President of Georgia during his speech to the European Parliament on November 23, 2010. This obligation was confirmed by the letter of the President of Georgia to the leadership of the EU, NATO, UN, and OSCE, as well as to the President of the United States.

Georgia continues to propose peaceful initiatives, including ones that envisage granting broad autonomy to the currently occupied regions, based on the European experiences.

Georgia welcomes all peaceful initiatives and proposals that would foster de-occupation of the territories. In order to advance the de-occupation of Georgian territories, the greater involvement of the international community is required in order to influence the Russian Federation. Specifically, Russia must be persuaded to undertake a non-aggression obligation vis-à-vis Georgia and to observe the norms of international law, including the principle of not deploying military forces on a sovereign nation’s territory without its consent. Moreover, Russia must respect all of its obligations under the EU-brokered Russian-Georgian Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008—above all to withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories. The adoption of the term “occupation” in international political and legal documents is also an important component of the de-occupation policy. In this regard, the documents adopted by the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the US Senate, and legislative bodies of other partner nations of Georgia carry great importance.

The Government of Georgia believes that the only efficient means for defusing tensions is the creation of a peaceful mechanism to provide for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territories, and the deployment of international peacekeeping/police forces there. Consequently, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is important for Georgia. However, the EUMM also must cover the occupied territories, consistent with the EUMM’s mandate. This will facilitate an effective peace process and the establishment of long-term peace. Moreover, the resolution of the Russian-Georgian conflict will have a positive impact on the resolution of other conflicts in neighboring states.

It is important that the international community continue its policy of non-recognition of the occupied territories and its acknowledgment of the fact of ethnic cleansing and ethnic persecution committed in these territories. Particularly important from this point of view are the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011; the UN Security Council Resolution of 1993; the OSCE Summit documents adopted in Budapest in 1994, in Lisbon in 1996, in Istanbul in 1999; and the European Parliament Resolution of November 17, 2011.

To neutralize the threat of terrorist attacks launched by the Russian Federation from the occupied territories, Georgia is developing the means to fight terrorism and is actively cooperating with the international community against this threat.

The return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their places of permanent residence, restitution of their property rights, and the provision of security guarantees should be ensured, in compliance with the principles of justice, equality, human rights. and freedom, based on the norms of international law. Of particular importance are the provisions that will give them the opportunity for safe, voluntary, and dignified return. Georgia will resist with all legitimate and peaceful means all attempts by the Russian Federation to change illegally the demographic composition and property situation in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, including the so-called agreements imposed on the people remaining there.

1.2. Relations with the Russian Federation: Georgia is willing to have good-neighborly relations with the Russian Federation, based on the principle of equality—which is impossible without respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and the beginning of de-occupation. Georgia is willing to start a dialogue with the Russian Federation on these fundamental issues.

Georgia would welcome the transformation of the Russian Federation into a stable, democratic country that respects other countries’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic values, and market economy principles. Democratization and a predictable foreign policy in the Russian Federation would have a positive influence on Georgian, regional, and international security.

The integration of Georgia into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions will foster peace and stability in the Caucasus, ensuring Russian security on its southern borders, which should be in the Russian Federation’s interest as well.

Establishing a peaceful and cooperative environment in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation is of particular importance to Georgia. Georgia realizes the need to deepen and develop relationships with the peoples of the North Caucasus, which will increase their awareness of Georgia’s goals and political course, contributing to the creation of an atmosphere of trust, peace, and stability in the Caucasus. The languages of the peoples of the North Caucasus, their culture and history are part of the world’s heritage; their preservation and development is thus important for Georgia. The preservation of the unique nature of the Caucasus and of the region’s environmental security, along with the related issues, should become the subject of joint efforts by Georgia and the peoples of the North Caucasus.

The Caucasus is a common home for all individuals and groups living here. Georgia supports the peaceful resolution of all existing conflicts in the Caucasus in accordance with the principles of international law. Th ethnic and religious diversity of the Caucasus is a positive characteristic of the region that, in conditions of goodwill, democracy, and the protection of human rights, will form a solid foundation for the region’s stability, peace and development.

2. Development of state institutions and strengthening of democracy

The citizens of Georgia are determined to develop a free, democratic society, and to strengthen the rule of law—a society in which all citizens are equal before the law, one which is transparent and accountable and guarantees rights and freedoms to all citizens, including the right to freedom of speech, thought, conscience, religion and belief, and freedom of association. Such a political system is the main precondition for the further development of the nation.

The Constitution of Georgia distributes functions among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power, creating the basis for a democratic government. Changes in the Constitution of Georgia in 2010 are important for the further development of state institutions and the self-governance of the country. The legislative and executive branches are being reformed and optimized, while a transparent, accountable, and competent public service has been established.

The establishment of the rule of law is achieved through reforms to the judicial system that aim to further increase the independence and effectiveness of the courts. Steps to enhance trust towards judiciary, including enhancement of the jury system, are important.

Georgia pays great attention to the establishment of an efficient system of local self-governance, and strives to create favorable conditions for the development of political parties, different unions of citizens, interest groups, business associations, non-governmental organizations, and mass media. This fosters the development of a strong and active civil society, thus strengthening democracy and responsible, accountable government.

Georgia has achieved significant success in the fight against corruption. Despite the fact that corruption no longer represents a challenge to national security, the fight against corruption requires constant vigilance by state institutions and civil society. In this regard, Georgia will continue to pursue policies to further increase transparency in government.

3. Implementation of the Engagement Policy

Georgia is determined to create the formats, mechanisms, and incentives that can foster engagement between the occupied territories and other Georgian regions, thus restoring relationships among the citizens of Georgia living on different sides of the occupation line. To this end, the Government of Georgia has prepared a State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation and an Action Plan for Engagement.

Georgia is interested in continuing to cooperate with the international community in order to draw on its resources and experience in implementing the engagement policy. Coordination with the Government of Georgia on humanitarian projects in the occupied territories is also essential for the successful implementation of the engagement policy.

4. Development of the defense and security system of Georgia

To protect its national security, Georgia implements reforms to increase the efficiency of its security system. The cornerstone of these reforms is the National Security Review process that includes institutionalized policy coordination among state agencies, increased cooperation between military and civil institutions, and the development of specific strategies for all agencies involved in the security sector.

One of the priorities of Georgian security policy is a unified, flexible, permanent, and efficient crisis management system that coordinates among state institutions defined by Georgian legislation. This system provides for the anticipation of possible crisis situations and their avoidance, or, in case of a crisis, ensures the rapid termination or minimization of its negative effects.

One of the most important pillars of Georgia’s security policy involves strengthening the country’s defense capabilities, given the transformed security environment. The Government of Georgia adapts its armed forces to meet the new challenges, operating environments, and tasks it confronts. Georgia pays special attention to measures to increase the readiness and ability of its military forces to respond to external aggression. These measures aim to ensure contemporary standards in the education and training system, to further develop the personnel management system, to improve the command and control system, to increase interoperability with NATO, and to foster Euro-Atlantic integration.

To develop these pillars, the relevant doctrinal basis is created and implemented. Along with this, the rational management of the critically important capabilities and resources for defense is a part of the strategic defense review process. In addition, it is important to implement an efficient crisis management system in the armed forces, as well as to establish a cooperation framework among the military and civilian components of the nation’s security system.

Georgia’s defense planning is based on the principle of total defense, which requires the successful implementation of a civil defense system, along with related education and training, the development of proper infrastructure, and the creation of an effective military reserve. A new reserve system will improve reservist training, command and control, and the active involvement of the population in territorial defense. To develop the reserve and mobilization system, Georgia considers it a priority to cooperate with partner countries and to learn from their experience. Georgia remains dedicated to democratic values and to its continued integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore, the increased interoperability of the Georgian Armed Forces with NATO remains the priority of Georgian defense reform. To strengthen its defensive capabilities, Georgia attaches particular significance to deepening bilateral cooperation and to the assistance provided by partner countries.

Georgia is doing its utmost to make a significant contribution to ongoing NATO operations. Successfully concluded military missions by Georgian units during these operations not only increase the importance of Georgia for the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, but also enrich the military experience of the Georgian Armed Forces.

5. Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union

One of Georgia’s major foreign and security policy priorities is membership in NATO and the European Union. As a Black Sea and Southeast European country, Georgia is part of Europe geographically, politically, and culturally; yet it was cut off from its natural course of development by historical cataclysms. Integration into NATO and the EU is Georgia’s sovereign choice, one which will strengthen Georgia’s security and ensure its stable development.

5.1 Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Accession to NATO is an important foreign policy objective of Georgia. Georgia views NATO as the basis of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture as well as the major mechanism for ensuring security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. Georgia’s membership in NATO will create solid guarantees for the nation’s security and stability and will play an important role in strengthening stability in the entire region. Reforms related to NATO membership help to strengthen the country’s democratic institutions and foster its defense capabilities. There is wide political and public consensus in Georgia regarding membership in the Alliance, which was confirmed by the results of a plebiscite held in 2008.

Since 2004, Georgia has achieved significant progress in cooperation with NATO. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO member countries agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO; that commitment was reaffirmed in the Strasbourg/Kiel and Lisbon Summit decisions, as well as in the new Strategic Concept of NATO.

The military aggression by the Russian Federation could not alter Georgia’s course toward democratic development and NATO integration. The creation of the NATO-Georgia Commission after the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 and the beginning of implementation of the Annual National Plan, as well as the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Georgia, gave new impetus to NATO-Georgia relations. Georgia believes that the participation of the Parliament of Georgia in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is particularly important.

Georgia is not only a consumer of security, but also shares responsibility for collective security and actively participates in international missions. Participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is important. Georgia is one of the major contributors to military operations in Afghanistan and is ready to ensure their successful conclusion, along with other NATO forces.

5.2. Integration into the European Union: Georgia’s stage-by-stage integration into the European Union represents one of the most important directions of the nation’s political and economic development. Deepening cooperation with the EU supports the further strengthening of Georgia’s democratic institutions and security, as well as its economic integration with the EU.

Broadening institutional frameworks of cooperation with the EU is important for Georgia. Georgia strives to achieve the Four Freedoms (free movement of people, goods, services, and capital) with the EU. Georgia considers the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership as important factors contributing to Georgia’s integration into the EU.

Georgia has launched negotiations with the EU on an Association Agreement to achieve a higher level of political association and economic integration with the EU, including the development of deep and comprehensive free trade relations.

Georgia attaches particular importance to the successful implementation of the visa simplification and readmission agreements with the EU, as well as the initiatives included in the Mobility Partnership framework. Georgia aims to further liberalize the visa regime with the EU and to ultimately achieve visa-free travel.

The development of sectoral cooperation with the EU in energy security, transport, education, culture, and other spheres is important for Georgia.

Georgia places special emphasis on more active EU involvement in resolving the Russian-Georgian conflict. It is important that the EU and other members of the international community have recognized the occupation of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation. Hence, Georgia welcomes resolution to this effect of the European Parliament adopted on November 17, 2011.

Georgia welcomes the EU’s goal of achieving greater engagement and cooperation with Russia. At the same time, Georgia believes that such a policy can be productive only if it facilitates the establishment of a Russian foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with its neighbors and respect for their sovereignty, as well as the development of democracy in Russia.

It is of principal importance to Georgia that the EU, as the mediator of the Russian-Georgian Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008, exercise effective influence on the Russian Federation to fulfill the norms of international law and the international obligations it has undertaken.

6. Cooperation in the South Caucasus

Georgia emphasizes the importance of cooperation in its neighborhood and takes political and economic steps to facilitate the transformation of the South Caucasus into an economically attractive, peaceful, and safe region.

Georgia traditionally has enjoyed good neighborly relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Georgia believes that the establishment of a common approach to the region’s future development is extremely important. Deepening regional cooperation and developing a common economic space and market would promote the stability and well-being of the region. The potential of Georgia as a Black Sea littoral state is a supporting factor for the development of multilateral cooperation.

Despite existing obstacles, there is potential for cooperation among the three South Caucasus countries in areas such as joint efforts against international terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, as well as in developing joint measures to improve the environmental situation. From a long-term perspective, deepening the relationship in these ways will foster trilateral economic cooperation and political dialogue.

The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is undermining the stability of the countries in the region. Georgia would welcome a peaceful resolution to this conflict, based on the principles of international law and greater involvement of the international community in the peace process.

Georgia strives to deepen partner relationships and expand trade with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The implementation of major economic projects in the region not only has economic value, but is also important in terms of strengthening security through trust-building, better cooperation, and the establishment of long-term business partnerships.

Georgia’s relationship with Azerbaijan has developed into a strategic partnership. Joint energy, transport, and communications projects significantly contribute to the stability and well-being of both nations. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway project is noteworthy since it will increase the transit role of Georgia and Azerbaijan, connecting them fully to international railway networks. This railway line will support the further deepening of economic ties between east and west and will move Georgia closer to the European economic space. It is important to maintain the competitiveness of this transit corridor through cooperation with Azerbaijan.

The three most important regional energy projects - the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline—not only are economically important, but they also increase stability in the region. Likewise, the realization of projects such as Nabucco, the Eurasian Oil Transportation Corridor, White Stream, and AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania-Interconnector Project)—involving the resources of Azerbaijan and Central Asia and making full use of the Georgia-Azerbaijan transit corridor—will strengthen regional security. This is in the interests of Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as of other states.

Georgia also closely cooperates with Azerbaijan on political and security issues, as well as on Euro-Atlantic integration. Partnership between Georgia and Azerbaijan is also important in the framework of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). The participation of Azerbaijan in the European Union’s Eastern Partnership and in the NATO Partnership for Peace program contributes to the harmonization of security interests and the development of common approaches to various strategic issues.

Georgia enjoys close cooperation with Armenia in all areas of mutual interest. Georgia believes that the deepening of good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with Armenia is in line with the national interests of both countries and strengthens the traditional friendship between them, while also fostering economic prosperity and political stability.

Georgia aspires to strengthen trade, economic, and transportation ties with Armenia. Cooperation in trade, transport infrastructure, tourism, and other fields will support the economic development of Georgia and Armenia.

Georgia supports Armenia’s active participation in the European Union Eastern Partnership and welcomes Armenia’s more active cooperation with NATO. Georgia welcomes all efforts to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations and to establish good neighborly ties between them.

7. Strengthening foreign relationships

Strengthening foreign political ties is a priority for Georgia, as is expanding foreign trade, attracting investment, and strengthening social and cultural links. To reach this goal, Georgia cooperates with the international community in bilateral and multilateral formats.

7.1. United States of America: Since the restoration of Georgia’s independence, the US has actively supported Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, the strengthening of its democratic institutions, the development of its market economy, and the country’s full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Georgia continues to deepen its strategic partnership with the US, a fact reflected in the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in January 2009. By focusing on the implementing of concrete decisions by working groups, this document advances the development of mutual relations in defense and security; economy, trade, and energy, democracy; and intercultural exchanges.

Support from the United States on the issue of the de-occupation of the Georgian territories is important for Georgia.

The deepening of economic and trade relations with the United States, attracting US investments, and growing Georgian exports to the US are important for Georgia. The preferential trade regime with the US advantages import tariffs to Georgia. At the same time, the Georgian Government is determined to complete a free-trade agreement with the United States.

Financial support from the US since the restoration of independence has been very important for Georgia. In particular, the $1 billion in aid provided after the 2008 Russian aggression was especially significant to the Georgian people. Projects within the framework of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation have assisted in strengthening democratic institutions, developing infrastructure, and advancing humanitarian projects. Educational and scientific programs are also important as they promote education and raise the qualification levels of Georgian students and scientists.

Georgian defense capabilities have been significantly strengthened through US assistance programs. Georgia is interested in further deepening cooperation in this area.

Georgia actively continues to provide military and political support to the coalitions led by the United States. Georgian units, trained under US assistance programs, successfully participate in the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Georgia and the US also closely and successfully cooperate in the fight against nuclear smuggling.

7.2. Ukraine: Georgia is determined to make the utmost of the potential of strategic partnership with Ukraine. Ukraine, growing in its role as a democratic and peaceful state, will contribute to regional stability and security in Europe.

Georgia and Ukraine cooperate in foreign and national security policy, not only on a bilateral level but also in such multilateral contexts as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and GUAM. Cooperation with Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic integration process is important. Georgia also welcomes Ukraine’s participation in the EU’s Eastern Partnership.

7.3. Turkey:Turkey is Georgia’s leading partner in the region. Turkey supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and its efforts to develop stable political, economic, and security institutions.

Turkey is Georgia’s largest trade and economic partner. Free trade and visa-free regimes operate between Georgia and Turkey. Deepening economic, energy, and transport relationships, and the successful implementation of other projects, are of strategic importance for both countries. Georgia and Turkey cooperate in regional projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines. Regional energy and transportation projects such as Nabucco, the Eurasian Oil Transport Corridor, White Stream, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway, which are in various stages of planning and realization, are also important.

Turkey, as a NATO member-state and a regional leader, is an important military partner for Georgia. Georgia attaches great importance to further developing its partnership with Turkey in the areas of defense and security.

Deepening cultural relations is also very important. Georgia and Turkey have begun cooperating on cultural heritage monuments. Deepening this cooperation is in the interests of both countries.

7.4. Cooperation with the nations of the various regions of the world: Georgia actively cooperates with the Baltic countries on a broad range of issues. Sharing the experience of the Baltic States in European and Euro-Atlantic integration is important for Georgia. Support from these countries to Georgia on its path to NATO and EU integration is important.

Georgia considers cooperation with Central and Southeast European and Scandinavian states to be of significant importance. Deepening economic and political relations with these states, and their support for Georgian sovereignty and reforms, are important. Georgia attaches great importance to cooperation with Moldova and Belarus and welcomes their participation in the EU’s Eastern Partnership.

Georgia, as a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, pays great attention to close cooperation with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, especially with respect to the economy, transport, and energy. The main goal of this cooperation is to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital between West and East. It is important for Georgia to keep the Central Asian states informed about Georgia’s ongoing reform processes and its foreign policy priorities. The Russian Federation’s attempts to forcefully change international borders that were recognized after the dissolution of the Soviet Union challenge the security of Russia’s neighbors.

Georgia attaches great importance to deepening political dialogue and economic relations with China, Japan, South Korea, Israel, the Persian Gulf states, Canada, India, Brazil, Australia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia in order to foster trade and investment, and to generate international support to Georgia.

It is important to continue establishing diplomatic relations with Latin American and Caribbean states and to develop political, trade, economic, and cultural relationships with them in order to provide for Georgia’s economic growth, attract investments, and raise awareness of Georgia in these countries. Special attention should be paid to gaining further support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and to mutually beneficial cooperation within the UN and other international organizations.

7.5. Multilateral cooperation forums: Cooperation with the international community in multilateral forums is an important foreign and national security policy priority for Georgia.

7.5.1. The United Nations (UN): Georgia believes that the UN should play a leading role in establishing global peace and in advancing just resolutions of existing conflicts. Therefore, it is important to increase the effectiveness of the UN. Georgia views negatively the termination of the United Nation’s Observer Mission in Georgia as a result of Russian pressure; it considers this an unhelpful precedent that has a negative impact on the UN’s role in establishing peace and security in the world.

7.5.2. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (OSCE): The OSCE is a very important organization for ensuring European security, playing a leading role in strengthening peace, stability, democracy, and human rights in Europe.

Georgia is committed to the Helsinki Final Act and the principles of other fundamental OSCE documents, which are based on profound respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Georgia believes that the further advancement of the OSCE’s role will contribute to strengthening the security of member states.

Russia blocked OSCE activities in Georgia to decrease the level of international engagement in the occupied Georgian territories. The Government of Georgia will make every effort, based on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, to return the OSCE mission to Georgia, including to its territories occupied by the Russian Federation. OSCE support for the development of democratic institutions and the successful implementation of reforms is important for Georgia.

7.5.3. Council of Europe: Georgia considers cooperation in the framework of the Council of Europe as the best opportunity to establish European political and legal values and norms. Georgia adheres to the Council of Europe’s standards as an important factor in the development of a democratic state based on Western values and norms. Georgia is determined to fulfill the recommendations of the Council of Europe on issues of democratic development at the local and regional levels, as well as with respect to human rights, the rights of national minorities, and strengthening the rule of law.

Georgia considers very important the participation of the Parliament of Georgia in the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE and Council of Europe.

8. Fight against international terrorism and transnational organized crime

The goal of Georgia’s counterterrorism policy is to ensure the security of its citizens, the state, and other institutions. Georgia has joined the counterterrorism conventions and protocols of the UN and actively cooperates on counterterrorism at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

In order to achieve its goals, the Government of Georgia actively cooperates with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and strengthens the means to fight terrorism, including the armed forces and the special forces of te law enforcement agencies. In order to preclude the use of Georgian territory as a transit route for terrorists, Georgia strengthens border protection and customs control, actively cooperating with Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan on counterterrorism and fighting transnational organized crime.

A significant terrorist threat for Georgia comes from the territories occupied by the Russian Federation. Terrorist acts have been organized from the occupied territories by members of the Russian occupation forces. Effective pressure from the international community on the Russian Federation is important to neutralize this threat; Russia should pay a heavy political price for continuing such terrorist acts.

Georgia attaches great importance to the threat of nuclear terrorism and, therefore, actively cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency, other international organizations, and states to preclude use of the Georgian territory for the the production and transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials. In this regard, the situation in the Russian-occupied territories of Georgia is of particular concern.

Participation in multinational counterterrorism operations gives Georgia an opportunity to contribute to the activities of the counterterrorist coalition. International terrorism represents a global threat. Therefore, the failure of the international community in Afghanistan would have a negative impact on international and regional security, as well as on Georgia’s security.

9. Economic security policy

Georgia’s economic policy is based on the principle of economic freedom. The goal of Georgia’s economic security policy is to create all the necessary conditions to encourage the nation’s development, the prosperity of its citizens, the improvement of their competitiveness, and the competitiveness of the economy as a whole.

An important priority of Georgia’s economic security policy is to increase macro-economic stability by further improving and simplifying tax administration; reducing the budget deficit to ensure financial soundness; implementing conservative fiscal and monetary policy; reaching and maintaining a minimal level of inflation; reducing the public spending; and minimizing the national debt.

One of the most important goals of Georgia’s foreign and security policy is to encourage healthy economic cooperation, including the promotion of free trade regimes with the EU, the US, and states in the region. Strong cross-border economic relations will support the reduction of regional tensions and the resolution of regional conflicts. In this regard, Georgia will continue economic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and other states of the Black Sea region, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Further development of the transport infrastructure; maximum utilization of the country’s transport, transit, and communication potential; and the full integration of Georgia into international transport systems is equally important in developing the country’s role as a regional logistical center.

Georgia’s economic policy ensures the state’s non-intervention in the economic activities of individuals and businesses; the protection of property rights and economic liberty; the further improvement of tax administration; and the maintenance of conservative fiscal policy.

Georgia is striving to create conditions for easy access to high-quality goods and services for its citizens. The goals of Georgia’s economic policy, therefore, are to create and maintain a favorable foreign investment environment; to raise the competitiveness of its citizens and of the overall economy; to boost employment by creating and maintaining a competitive labor market. In order to increase the economic competitiveness of Georgia’s citizens and of the economy as a whole, it is critically important to encourage the development of a qualified workforce, which can be achieved by implementing a focused education policy.

10. Energy security policy

In order to ensure sustainable energy security for Georgia, it is important to create a favorable investment environment, to strengthen international cooperation, and to further develop the existing energy infrastructure. Also, great importance is attached to the diversification of energy resources and suppliers, as well as to participation in international and regional energy projects. In this regard, Georgia welcomes the implementation of new projects in the framework of the South Energy Corridor, including those projects that will supply oil and natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions through Georgia to Europe.

Georgia is a part of important energy corridors. Georgia is aware of its role in supplying the rest of the world with energy resources from the Caspian Sea and Central Asian regions via alternative routes. Georgia’s Black Sea ports, the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are already active and strategically important projects. Georgia is determined to ensure the effective functioning of these existing projects and to develop prospective new ones.

Among the main priorities of Georgia’s energy policy are the development of energy infrastructure, the more efficient use of hydropower, and research into other clean-energy resources. Georgia actively cooperates with foreign investors on developing renewable energy resources.

The construction of new electricity transmission lines and power plants, and the rehabilitation of old hydropower stations, contributes to the reduction of Georgia’s dependency on imported energy sources and, consequently, to the improvement of Georgia’s energy security. Georgia’s goal is to become an important regional exporter of electricity. Therefore, in addition to increased energy production, new transmission lines must be constructed between Georgia and other countries.

11. Education policy

Improving the education system is an important priority for the Georgian Government. The comprehensive reform of the education system is aimed at qualitatively improving general, vocational, and higher education; advancing a knowledge-based civil society; and creating conditions that foster the development of the sciences. Increasing participation of the private sector is important for the further development of the education system.

Georgia’s reformed educational system should give Georgian citizens the opportunity to fully develop their abilities and to be competitive in the Georgian and global labor markets.

Programs in information technology and foreign languages, especially the English language, are important components of education system reform.

The development of vocational education is an important reform priority. The dynamic development of Georgia’s economy requires the further improvement of the vocational education system.

Further improvements to the higher education system is very important for Georgia’s development. Support for top-quality higher education is a precondition for increasing Georgia’s scientific potential and economic prosperity. It is also important to deepen international cooperation in the fields of scientific studies and new technologies.

12. Social security and healthcare policy

The goals of Georgia’s social security policy are to overcome poverty, improve living standards, and develop a strong middle class.

In order to ensure the social security of Georgian citizens, it is important to develop an environment that fosters job creation and further improving those aspects of the social security that provide social assistance to people living below the poverty line.

The healthcare policy of the Government of Georgia focuses on improving the delivery of medical services; the refinement of the medical education and certification system; increasing efficiency in preventing and managing epidemics and pandemics; preventing and treating socially dangerous diseases (TB, AIDS, drug-addiction, etc.); preventing especially dangerous infectious diseases; developing efficient laboratory surveillance systems; promoting a healthy lifestyle; increasing the availability of medical services through the further refinement of insurance systems; and providing medical services to people living below the poverty line.

13. Cyber security policy

Georgia has set a goal of creating a cyber security system that can minimize the consequences of any cyber attack and that can rapidly and effectively restore affected networks in case of an attack.

Georgia places special emphasis on the security of classified information and the protection of the state’s information systems. Georgia is in the process of establishing the necessary legal framework and infrastructure to improve information technologies and the protection of information.

Cooperation with partner states and the sharing of experiences is important for Georgia’s cyber security.

14. Environmental Security Policy

The environmental security policy of Georgia protects people and the environment by reducing the use of natural resources and the prevention of environmental damage caused by natural and manmade crises. Special attention is paid to such disasters as floods, landslides, avalanches, and earthquakes, as well as industrial accidents, etc.

The goal of Georgia’s environmental policy is to develop and implement efficient measures to prevent pollution of all kinds—of air, water, and earth—to protect forest resources and the Black Sea, and to manage radioactive and other hazardous materials on the territory of Georgia.

The Government of Georgia is aware that the country’s environmental security demands close regional and international cooperation. The participation of international organizations in preventing the further deterioration of the environmental situation in the Russian-occupied territories of Georgia is important. The Government of Georgia will employ all diplomatic means to increase international pressure on the Russian Federation to cease the illegal extraction of natural construction materials and timber resources from Abkhazia to be used for construction related to the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, as these acts will cause an environmental disaster on the Black Sea coast of Georgia—and well beyond.

Georgia cooperates on environmental security with countries in the region. Successful cooperation between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Georgia will contribute to the protection of the natural environment and the improvement of environmental security.

15. Protection of Georgia’s Cultural Heritage

Georgia, in close cooperation with UNESCO and other international organizations, is determined to protect and develop the country’s unique cultural heritage, which is an important part of the world’s cultural heritage. It is therefore necessary to implement Georgia’s cultural heritage protection policy, which aims to promote modern and traditional Georgian arts and to protect architectural monuments. At the same time, in order to protect Georgia’s cultural heritage abroad, Georgia will actively cooperate with the states in which Georgian cultural monuments are located or whose archives or museums hold artifacts of Georgian culture.

Georgian cultural heritage monuments are under especially serious threat in the Russian-occupied territories. The international community should take an active part in protecting cultural heritage in the occupied territories. From this point of view, cooperation with UNESCO, ICCROM, ICOMOS, and IUCN is especially important.

16. Demographic policy

In order to improve the demographic situation, Georgia supports measures to increase the birth rate, decrease infant mortality rates, introduce a healthy lifestyle, and increase life expectancy.

Georgia also strives to create favorable conditions for the return to Georgia of Georgian citizens and other compatriots living abroad.

Georgia is concerned by the Russian policy of illegally and artificially changing the demographics in the occupied territories by settling Russian citizens there under favorable conditions. Georgia will do its utmost not to allow the legitimization of the results of these policies and to support the survival and development of the ethnic and cultural identity of the Abkhaz and Ossetian people.

17. Civil Integration Policy

The Government of Georgia supports the process of integrating ethnic minorities and fostering their engagement in Georgian society. It is important to increase knowledge of the Georgian language among ethnic minorities, while allowing them complete freedom to retain their identity and culture. This policy is stipulated in the National Concept of Tolerance and Civil Integration and the related Action Plan. The state takes measures to teach ethnic minorities the Georgian language, which helps them to fully realize their civil rights and freedoms.

Georgia assigns great importance to the creation of an environment that fosters the reintegration and civic engagement of Georgian emigrants who return home.

18. Policy of Strengthening Relations with the diaspora

The preservation of the Georgian identity of compatriots living abroad is a priority for the Georgian Government. Georgia supports and assists the establishment and operation of overseas Georgian Sunday schools, Georgian language courses, Georgian public schools, and folk and art groups, as well as other efforts aimed at the preservation and development of the country’s cultural heritage. Georgia also supports the deepening of ties among the Georgian diaspora members residing in various countries and the realization of joint projects by them.

International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) concluded its work and presented a final report. It lays out the progress achieved during the reform process. The publication of the Final Report by ISAB was supported by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Georgia Office (FES). (The document was kindly provided by Ms. Ia Tikanadze, Country Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Georgia Office, March, 2019).

Georgia and the World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future, by the Government of Georgia. The document officially sets three important elements of the national security policy: foreign policy, foreign economic and defense strategies. The document was presented at the International Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Mr. Irakli Menagarishvili. The conference was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Sheraton Metechi Palace Hotel accordingly on 5-6 October, 2000. (The document was kindly provided by Mr. Irakli Menagarishvili, February, 2019).